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Abstract
Legal scholarship has come to accept as true the various pronouncements of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other scientists who have been
active in the movement for greenhouse gas (ghg) emission reductions to combat global
warming. The only criticism that legal scholars have had of the story told by this group
of activist scientists – what may be called the climate establishment – is that it is too
conservative in not paying enough attention to possible catastrophic harm from
potentially very high temperature increases.
This paper departs from such faith in the climate establishment by comparing the
picture of climate science presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and other global warming scientist advocates with the peer-edited scientific
literature on climate change. A review of the peer-edited literature reveals a systematic
tendency of the climate establishment to engage in a variety of stylized rhetorical
techniques that seem to oversell what is actually known about climate change while
concealing fundamental uncertainties and open questions regarding many of the key
processes involved in climate change. Fundamental open questions include not only the
size but the direction of feedback effects that are responsible for the bulk of the
temperature increase predicted to result from atmospheric greenhouse gas increases:
while climate models all presume that such feedback effects are on balance strongly
positive, more and more peer-edited scientific papers seem to suggest that feedback
effects may be small or even negative. The cross-examination conducted in this paper
reveals many additional areas where the peer-edited literature seems to conflict with the
picture painted by establishment climate science, ranging from the magnitude of 20th
century surface temperature increases and their relation to past temperatures; the
possibility that inherent variability in the earth’s non-linear climate system, and not
increases in CO2, may explain observed late 20th century warming; the ability of climate
models to actually explain past temperatures; and, finally, substantial doubt about the
methodological validity of models used to make highly publicized predictions of global
warming impacts such as species loss.

*

I am grateful to Cary Coglianese for extensive conversations and comments on an early draft, and to the
participants in the September, 2008 Penn Law Faculty Retreat for very helpful discussion about this
project. Especially helpful comments from David Henderson, Julia Mahoney, Ross McKitrick, Richard
Lindzen, and Roger Pielke, Sr. have allowed me to correct errors in earlier drafts, but it is important to
stress that no one except myself has any responsibility for the views expressed herein.
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Insofar as establishment climate science has glossed over and minimized such
fundamental questions and uncertainties in climate science, it has created widespread
misimpressions that have serious consequences for optimal policy design. Such
misimpressions uniformly tend to support the case for rapid and costly decarbonization of
the American economy, yet they characterize the work of even the most rigorous legal
scholars. A more balanced and nuanced view of the existing state of climate science
supports much more gradual and easily reversible policies regarding greenhouse gas
emission reduction, and also urges a redirection in public funding of climate science
away from the continued subsidization of refinements of computer models and toward
increased spending on the development of standardized observational datasets against
which existing climate models can be tested.
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I. Introduction
In recent Congressional hearings, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts stated that
not a single peer-reviewed scientific paper contradicts the “consensus” view that
increasing greenhouse gas emissions will lead to a “catastrophic” two degree Celsius
increase in global mean temperatures.1 Senator Kerry is hardly alone in this belief.
Virtually all environmental law scholars seem to believe that there is now a “scientific
consensus” that anthropogenic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions have caused late twentieth
century global warming and that if dramatic steps are not immediately taken to reduce
those emissions, then the warming trend will continue, with catastrophic consequences
for the world.2 Indeed, even those scholars – such as Cass Sunstein, now serving as head
of the bureau responsible for regulatory cost-benefit analysis within the White House -who are somewhat leery of dramatic, and hugely costly reductions in ghg emissions,
emphasize the “strong consensus” that the world as a whole will be benefit from
“significant” steps to reduce ghg emissions.3
As the most authoritative and reliable evidence for the scientific “consensus”
about human responsibility for and the likely future consequences of global warming,
economists,4 legal scholars, 5 legislators6 and regulators7 – not to mention the more
1

See Kenneth P. Green, Countering Kerry’s Catastrophic Climate Claims, available at
www.aei.org/outlook/100096 (December, 2009).
2
See, for example, Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights 27 J. Land Res. & Envtl. L. 255
(2007)(“The scientific consensus is now clear… permafrost is melting in the arctic. Glaciers around the
world are receding…ecosystems across the globe are changing. …Scientists estimate that human-induced
climate change will drive a quarter of the species on earth to extinction by mid-century…we are witnessing
‘the end of Nature’”); Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests 109 Colum.
L. Rev. 1531, 1544 (2009) (“We take the current scientific consensus – that global warming is occurring,
that its rapid acceleration in the last hundred and fifty years has been caused primarily by human
behavior…and that it poses significant risks of substantial harm from a variety of impacts – as a starting
point.”)
3
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, University of Chicago Law School, Olin
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 354, at 7 (August, 2007).
4
See the numerous examples of how prominent climate change economists have uncritically endorsed the
IPCC as authoritative provided by David Henderson, Economists and Climate Science: A Critique, 10
World Econ. 59 (2009).
5
See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay? 3-5 (2008); Freeman and Guzman,
supra note __ at1544 nn 53-55; Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary
Principle, 96 Geo. L. J. 445, 447-448 (2008); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1153, 1189-1190 (2009)(“The
IPCC 2007 Report has removed any serious doubt from the political arena whether both significant
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from human activities and concrete plans to adapt to climate change
are now necessary. The long-awaited, and much-debated, scientific consensus regarding climate change
cause and effect is now at hand.”); Christopher H. Schroeder, Global Warming and the Problem of Policy
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popular media8 -- typically look to the most recent Assessment Reports of the U.N.’s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
According to Clause 2 of the IPCC's original, 1988 Governing Principles, “[t]he
role of the IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis
the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the
scientific basis of human-induced climate change…”9 The claim made by Clause 2 – that
the IPCC Assessment Reports are neutral, and objective assessments of what is known
about "human-induced" climate change and its impacts -- has been reiterated recently by
its longstanding Chairman, the energy economist R.K. Pachauri. He has said that the
IPCC:
“…mobilizes the best experts from all over the world…The Third Assessment
Report (TAR) of the IPCC was released in 2001 through the collective efforts of
around 2000 experts from a diverse range of countries and disciplines. All of the
IPCC’s reports go through a careful two stage review process by governments and
experts and acceptance by the member governments composing the panel.”10
Scientists who have been leaders in the process of producing these Assessment
Reports (“AR’s”) argue that they provide a “balanced perspective” on the “state of the
art” in climate science,11 with the IPCC acting as a rigorous and “objective assessor” of
what is known and unknown in climate science.12
Legal scholars have accepted this characterization, trusting that the IPCC AR’s
are the product of an “exhaustive review process” – involving hundreds of outside
reviewers and thousands of comments.13 Within mainstream environmental law
Innovation: Lessons from the Early Environmental Movement, 108 Envt’l L. 285, 303 (2009); Sinden,
Climate Change and Human Rights, supra note __ at 255 n1;
6
See, for example, the Democratic Policy Committee, Authoritative IPCC Report Confirms Existence,
Consequences of Global Climate Change (May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-new.cfm?doc_name=fs-110-1-79.
7
In its recent finding that greenhouse gas emissions may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health, the United States Environmental Protection Agency relied heavily on conclusions in IPCC
Assessment Reports. See EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66497, 66510-66512 (December 15,
2009).
8
Perhaps most famously, the movie The Inconvenient Truth dramatizes the IPCC as such an authoritative
and indeed prophetic institution.
9
Principles Governing IPCC Work Approved at the 14th Session (Vienna, 1-3 October, 1988), amended at
the 21st Session (Vienna, 3 and 6-7 November, 2003) and at the 25th Session (Mauritius, 26-28 April 2006),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/about/princ.pdf.
10
Quoted by David Henderson, Governments and Climate Change Issues: The Case for Rethinking, 8
World Econ. 183, 195 (2007).
11
Richard Wolfson and Stephen H. Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, in Climate Change Policy:
A Survey 3, 43 (Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz and John O. Niles, eds. 2002).
12
Susan Solomon and Martin Manning, The IPCC Must Maintain its Rigor, 319 Science 1457 (March 14,
2008).
13
See Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, supra note __ at 4.
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scholarship, the only concern expressed about the IPCC and “consensus” climate change
science is that the IPCC’s process has allowed for too much government influence
(especially from China and the U.S.), pressure that has caused the IPCC’s future
projections to be too cautious – too hesitant to confidently project truly catastrophic
climate change.14 Indeed, in a recent article, Jody Freeman – now serving as a White
House Counselor on climate change – and Andrew Guzman argue that such political
pressures have generated conservative IPCC Assessment Reports that “ignore” positive
feedback effects such as water vapor, downplay the risk of abrupt and irreversible change
in the climate system, and fly in the face of the “empirical record to date” which “shows
that every surprise about climate change thus far has been in the ‘wrong direction.’”15
Thus politicians, environmental law scholars and policymakers have clearly come
to have extreme confidence in the opinion of a group of scientists – many of whom play a
leading role on the IPCC – who hold that the late twentieth century warming trend in
average global surface temperature was caused by the buildup of anthropogenic ghg’s,
and that if ghg emissions are not reduced soon, then the 21st century may witness truly
catastrophic changes in the earth’s climate. In the legal and the policy literature on
global warming, this view – which may be called the opinion of the climate establishment
– is taken as a fixed, unalterable truth. It is virtually impossible to find anywhere in the
legal or the policy literature on global warming anything like a sustained discussion of
the actual state of the scientific literature on ghg emissions and climate change. Instead,
legal and policy scholars simply defer to a very general statement of the climate
establishment’s opinion (except when it seems too conservative), generally failing even
to mention work questioning the establishment climate story, unless to dismiss it with the
ad hominem argument that such work is the product of untrustworthy, industry-funded
“skeptics” and “deniers.”16
Given, however, that the most significant ghg emission reduction policies are
intended to completely alter the basic fuel sources upon which industrial economies and
societies are based, with the costs uncertain but potentially in the many trillions of
dollars, one would suppose that before such policies are undertaken, it would be
worthwhile to verify that the climate establishment’s view really does reflect an unbiased
and objective assessment of the current state of climate science. Insofar as the
established view is that promulgated by IPCC AR’s, such verification means comparing
what the IPCC has to say about climate science with what one finds in the peer-reviewed
climate science literature, and then questioning apparent inconsistencies between what is
said in the literature and what is said by the IPCC and other carriers of the establishment
climate story. This is essentially to undertake precisely the kind of cross-examination to
which American attorneys routinely subject hostile expert witnesses.

14

See Farber, supra note __ at 4 nn. 13-14; Freeman and Guzman, supra note __ at 1549-1550.
Freeman and Guzman, supra note __ at 1548.
16
See, e.g., Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39 ELR 10230, 1023410235 (2009)(discussing a smattering of such work under the heading “Deception and Denial of global
warming by industry”).
15
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This paper constitutes such a cross-examination. As anyone who has served as an
expert witness in American litigation can attest, even though an opposing attorney may
not have the expert’s scientific training, a well prepared and highly motivated trial
attorney who has learned something about the technical literature can ask very tough
questions, questions that force the expert to clarify the basis for his or her opinion, to
explain her interpretation of the literature, and to account for any apparently conflicting
literature that is not discussed in the expert report. My strategy in this paper is to adopt
the approach that would be taken by a non-scientist attorney deposing global warming
scientists serving as experts for the position that anthropogenic ghg emissions have
caused recent global warming and must be halted if serious and seriously harmful future
warming is to be prevented – what I have called above the established climate story. The
established story has emerged not only from IPCC AR’s themselves, but from other work
intended for general public consumption produced by scientists who are closely affiliated
with and leaders in the IPCC process. Hence the cross-examination presented below
compares what is said in IPCC publications and other similar work by leading climate
establishment scientists with what is found in the peer-edited climate science literature.
The point of this exercise in cross-examination is twofold. The first is just to run
a relatively simple check, as it were, on the claimed objectivity and unbiasedness of the
IPCC AR’s and other work underlying the established climate story. Do IPCC AR’s,
summaries and other work by leading climate establishment scientists seem to frankly
and openly acknowledge key assumptions, unknowns and uncertainties underlying the
establishment projections, or does work supporting the established story tend instead to
ignore, hide, minimize and downplay such key assumptions, uncertainties and
unknowns? To use legal terms, is the work by the IPCC and establishment story lead
scientists a legal brief – intended to persuade – or a legal memo – intended to objectively
assess both sides? The second and related objective of this Article is to use the cross
examination to identify what seem to be the key, policy-relevant areas of remaining
uncertainty in climate science, and to then at least begin to sketch the concrete
implications of such remaining uncertainty for the design of legal rules and institutions
adopted to respond to perceived climate change risks.
Far from turning up empty, my cross examination has (initially, to my surprise)
revealed that on virtually every major issue in climate change science, the IPCC AR’s
and other summarizing work by leading climate establishment scientists have adopted
various rhetorical strategies that seem to systematically conceal or minimize what appear
to be fundamental scientific uncertainties or even disagreements. The bulk of this paper
proceeds by cataloguing, and illustrating with concrete climate science examples, the
various rhetorical techniques employed by the IPCC and other climate change
scientist/advocates in an attempt to bolster their position, and to minimize or ignore
conflicting scientific evidence.
From the cross examination that constitutes Part I of this Article, it appears clear
that the establishment story has presented climate science so as to support two prior
beliefs: concerning the climate system, that anthropogenic ghg emissions have been
responsible for significant late 20th century warming and that one can confidently predict
6

even more serious future warming from continued emissions; and, concerning policy, that
the U.S. and other developed countries should rapidly reduce their ghg emissions and
decarbonize their economies. There are, to be sure, many chapters in the IPCC
Assessment Reports whose authors have chosen to quite fully disclose both what is
known as well as what is unknown, and subject to fundamental uncertainty, in their
particular field of climate science. Still, the climate establishment story -- comprising all
of the IPCC Assessment Reports, plus the IPCC’s “Policymaker Summaries,” plus the
freelance advocacy efforts of activist climate scientists (exemplified by James Hansen of
NASA) – seems overall to comprise an effort to marshal evidence in favor of a
predetermined policy preference, rather than to objectively assess both what is known
and unknown about climatic variation and its causes.
To conclude that establishment global warming science is not an objective or
unbiased assessment, but instead is an attempt to support the prior belief that human ghg
emissions are causing global warming and that such emissions must be dramatically and
quickly reduced, is not to say that the established view will ultimately be disconfirmed.
The problem is not the global warming advocacy science is wrong – something that in
any event I lack the expertise to determine – but that by overselling models and evidence,
global warming advocacy science has created some very serious misimpressions among
many people about what is known and understood about global climate, and has directed
media and policy attention solely to greenhouse gas emissions as the sole cause of
climate change. For example, in their forthcoming article,17 Jody Freeman and Andrew
Guzman -- the first of whom is now managing America’s climate negotiations as the
President’s Climate Counselor -- argue that climate models ignore many important
positive feedback effects. As I discuss in more detail below, however, it is only because
they presume that there are so many positive feedback effects that climate models get
their large projected temperature increases – indeed without such positive feedbacks,
climate models predict that a doubling of CO2 relative to the standard pre-industrial
baseline would lead to only about a 1 degree centigrade increase in global temperature.
And when one looks closely at the scientific literature, it turns out that some of the most
crucial (and actually testable) predictions or assumptions underlying predictions of
dangerous climate change are not in fact being confirmed by observations. Newspapers
are full of stories about melting ice sheets; what they neglect to report is that recent work
shows that changes in clouds and precipitation – crucial to the predictions of climate
models – are not what those climate models have assumed.18
The reader should be warned that the cross-examination presented in Part I does
entail actually discussing the substance of climate science. It is of course possible that
despite efforts to ensure accuracy, there remain mistakes in my interpretation of the
climate science literature, so that some of the questions I believe to be raised by that
literature are actually not well put. It is true that the possibility of such error is a primary
justification for what seems to be the dominant position in legal scholarship, that legal
scholars and policymakers more generally should simply “ask the scientists,” and then
17

Freeman and Guzman, Seawalls are Not Enough, supra note __ at __.
Such evidence is explained in a very concise and accessible way by Roy Spencer, Climate Confusion
(2008).

18
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accept on faith whatever conclusions are presented by such scientists. In the climate
science area, such a position – which becomes more specifically the recommendation that
policymakers simply follow the IPCC – has been defended on the ground that the
alternative, of “juxtaposing” IPCC conclusions against a “few contrarian opinions” risks
“muddying” the “public and political process…because few understand the very different
relative credibility of these various claimants to state-of-the-art knowledge.”19 This
position uses the inability of laypeople to fully assess the “relative credibility” of various
expert claims to accord extreme deference to the conclusions of institutions for the
assessment of regulatory science such as the IPCC.
The present article responds to this “relative credibility” problem by drawing only
from work published in top, peer-edited journals in the climate-related sciences, and/or
more popular work by scientists at the very best universities who routinely publish in
such peer-edited journals. Virtually all of the climate scientists whose work I discuss
would be characterized as part of the climate science mainstream and of unimpeachable
credibility, rather than “deniers” of questionable qualifications. When one looks at this
decidedly mainstream literature, one discovers a number of facts and findings that seem
not to well understood and which are rarely if ever even mentioned in the climate change
law and policy literature:
- There seem to be significant problems with the measurement of global surface
temperatures over both the relatively short run – late 20th century – and longer
run – past millennium – problems that systematically tend to cause an overestimation of late 20th century temperature increases relative to the past;
- Continuing scientific dispute exists over whether observations are confirming
or disconfirming key short-run predictions of climate models – such as an
increase in tropospheric water vapor and an increase in tropical tropospheric
surface temperatures relative to tropical surface temperatures;
- Climate model projections of increases of global average surface temperature
(due to a doubling of atmospheric CO2) above about 1 degree centigrade arise
only because of positive feedback effects presumed by climate models;
- Yet there is evidence that both particular feedbacks -- such as that from clouds
– and feedbacks in total may be negative, not positive;
- Confidence in climate models based on their ability to causally relate 20th
century temperature trends to trends in CO2 may well be misplaced, because
such models do not agree on the sensitivity of global climate to increases in
CO2 and are able to explain 20th century temperature trends only by making
arbitrary and widely varying assumptions about the net cooling impact of
atmospheric aerosols;
- Similar reason for questioning climate models is provided by continuing
scientific dispute over whether late 20th century warming may have been
simply a natural climate cycle, or have been caused by solar variation, versus
being caused by anthropogenic increases in atmospheric CO2;
- The scientific ability to predict what are perhaps the most widely publicized
adverse impacts of global warming – sea level rise and species loss – is much
19

Wolfson and Schneider, Understanding Climate Science, supra note __ at 43-44.
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less than generally perceived, and in the case of species loss, predictions are
based on a methodology that a large number of biologists have severely
criticized as invalid and as almost certain to lead to an overestimate of species
loss due to global warming;
- Finally, many of the ongoing disputes in climate science boil down to disputes
over the relative validity and reliability of different observational datasets,
suggesting that the very new field of climate science does not yet have
standardized observational datasets that would allow for definitive testing of
theories and models against observations.
The cross examination conducted below not only uncovers these findings in the
climate science literature, but shows that they are almost completely ignored by the IPCC
in its communications to policymakers and the media (Summaries for Policymakers and
Technical Summaries that accompany its full Assessment Reports) and by other members
of the climate establishment in their popularly accessible reviews and assessments of the
state of climate science. Rather than laying out contrasting positions that one finds in the
literature, the IPCC and other leading establishment climate scientists either simply
ignore or tersely dismiss scientific work that disputes or casts doubt upon the
assumptions underlying or projections made by climate models and establishment climate
science more generally. My cross examination clearly reveals a rhetoric of persuasion, of
advocacy that prevails throughout establishment climate science.
Perhaps the most straightforward justification for this rhetorical stance is that the
IPCC’s job is to assess the science – to adjudicate whatever disputes or disagreements
may exist in the literature -- and to then make a decision as to which side is most likely
correct. Having made such a decision about which is the “best” science currently
available, and in particular decided that there is “unequivocal” evidence that
anthropogenic ghg emissions have caused recent global warming, the IPCC’s job is then
to present that science in as persuasive a way as possible. Especially when potentially
planet-saving policy responses are on the line, to present the science in a way that instead
highlights questions and uncertainties would be to encourage doubt and potentially
harmful delay in adopting policies to reduce ghg emissions.
The problem with this justification is that the optimal policy to adopt with respect
to reductions in anthropogenic ghg emissions itself depends upon a fine, rather than
coarse-grained understanding of the state of scientific understanding. The more certain
and immediate is the threatened harm from continuing increases in anthropogenic ghg
emissions, the more will the cost-benefit policy calculus tip in favor of very expensive,
immediate and irreversible policy commitments to ghg emission reduction (and also,
although often overlooked, to adaptation investments). The more questionable is the
magnitude, timing and even existence of harm from continuing increases in human ghg
emissions, the greater the case for policies toward ghg emission reduction that are less
costly in the short run and more easily reversible in the long run. If policymakers are to
craft the correct policy, then they must understand the nature of the threat posed. The
rhetorical strategy that has come to dominate establishment climate science is not
designed to promote such fine-grained understanding; it is designed instead to convince
the public of what some, but by no means all, climate scientists have come to believe by
conveying a very scary and also very simple picture of the state of the science. Such
coarse understanding leads to a very coarse policy prescription: “Do something, anything,
9

now!” Such a policy prescription justifies virtually any policy, however costly or
inefficient, that can plausibly be argued to lead to ghg emission reductions at some point
in the future. The cross examination undertaken in this Article clearly reveals important
questions, uncertainties and disputes in climate science. It is hard to imagine that any
policymaker who becomes aware of these and of the overall complexity of climate
science could rationally advocate the “Do something, anything, now!” policy prescription
so easily drawn from the alternative picture painted by the climate change establishment.
The bulk of this article, consisting of Part II, undertakes the substantive crossexamination of establishment climate science. In Part III, I summarize what the Part II
cross examination has revealed about the state of knowledge regarding the key, policy
relevant issues to be answered by climate science. Then I provide a few examples of
prominent legal scholarship that constructs policy arguments on the basis of very partial
or incomplete misunderstandings of the climate science literature. Finally, I conclude by
advocating a redirection in public funding for climate science.
II. Key Issues in Climate Science: Uncovering the rhetorical strategy of the IPCC and
the Climate Change Establishment
There are now a large number of books that give readers a basic introduction to
climate change science, and I have neither the expertise nor the ambition to provide such
an introduction here.20 What is important for the present purpose is that the reader recall
that the basic story told by climate change advocates is that a human-generated increase
in the atmospheric (tropospheric) concentration of human-generated greenhouse gases –
primarily carbon dioxide, CO221 – has already begun causing an increase in average
global surface temperature (as well as in the temperature of higher levels of the
troposphere). This story – which I call the “CO2 primacy” story – predicts also that these
temperature increases will continue and even accelerate if the global emission of
greenhouse gases (and atmospheric concentration of such gases) continues to increase.
These predictions are based primarily on computer models of the earth’s coupled oceanic
and atmospheric circulation system (such models are therefore called Coupled Ocean
Atmosphere General Circulation Models, or COAGCM’s or just GCM’s for short). Such
model predictions are often said to be supported by paleoclimatic data on what the earth’s
20

A very clear and entirely non-mathematical explanation of the key mechanisms of both weather and
climate from the point of a view of a meteorologist who believes that weather mechanisms are of
fundamental significance in predicting climate change is provided by Roy W. Spencer, Climate Confusion
45-84 (2008). For a short and relatively non-technical introduction to some of the key physical
mechanisms of climate, see John E. Frederick, Principles of Atmospheric Science (2008), and for a more
comprehensive treatment see Dennis L. Hartmann, Global Physical Climatology (1994), while the physics
is succinctly covered by F.W. Taylor, Elementary Climate Physics (2005). For a comprehensive
introduction to three-dimensional climate models, see Warren M. Washington and Claire L. Parkinson, An
Introduction to Three-Dimensional Climate Modeling (2d ed. 2005).
21
Other strong greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide and chloroflourcarbons (CFC’s). Some of
these are much stronger greenhouse gases than CO2 but also much less concentrated in the atmosphere:
CFC’s, for example, are 20,000 times more powerful in absorbing infared radition than is CO2, but also a
million times less concentrated in the atmosphere. See William R. Cotton and Roger A. Pielke, Sr.,
Human Impacts on Weather and Climate 158 (2d ed. 2007).
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climate looked like in the near and far distant past when CO2 and temperature were
different than today. Such paleoclimatic data are recovered by taking ice cores from the
polar regions and sediment cores from the oceans (and elsewhere) using carbon and other
forms of dating to assign ages to different levels of the core, and then using the relative
proportion of different oxygen isotopes as a proxy for surface temperature and various
other proxies for atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. The models yield increasingly
concrete predictions regarding the impact of rising levels of greenhouse gases on global
mean surface temperature, but also on many dimensions of regional climate. The IPCC
Assessment Reports then go on to prognosticate about the possible impact of such a
changing climate not only on humans but also on non-human species.
There is much more detail to the story than this. That detail will emerge as I
question systematically this seemingly straightforward story.
A. What do we Really Know about Global Mean Surface Temperatures, and Can we
Really be So Sure about the Purported Warming Trend?
In AR4, the IPCC makes a number of unambiguous factual assertions regarding
global average temperature trends. The core assertions, which constitute the basic
“story” about global warming past and present told by the climate change establishment,
include the following:
i) global mean temperatures have risen about .74 degrees C over the last 100
hundred years, with the warming rate doubling over the last 50 years; the impacts of
urbanization and land use change on the land-based temperature record are “negligible;”
ii) both the troposphere and the surface have warmed;
iii) in the vast majority of land regions, there has been an increase in the number
of extremely warm days and a reduction in the number of extremely cold days, a dramatic
illustration of the former being the European heat wave of 2003;
iv) since about 1970, here has been an increase in the number of intense tropical
storms, “culminating” in the North Atlantic in the “record-breaking” 2005 hurricane
season, and this increase is correlated with an increase in sea surface temperatures
(SST’s);
v) Now that many measurement errors have been corrected, satellite observations
of temperatures in the lower troposphere are “broadly consistent” with the surface
measurement trend, although a cooling bias likely persists in the tropics;22
vi) Research since the 2001 IPCC Assessment Report has “strengthened the
conclusion of ‘exceptional warmth of the late 20th century, relative to the past 1000
years,…’”23 and “[a]verage Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the second half of
22
23

Assertions (i) through (iv), IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis 237-239.
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the 20th century were very likely higher than during any other 50-year period in the last
500 years and likely the highest in at least the last 1,300 years.”24
Every one of these assertions – all made with enormous confidence -- seems to
mask substantial and increasing scientific disagreement and uncertainty. Leaving for
another time the discussion of the seemingly enormous gap between what the IPCC
continues to assert or imply about global warming and hurricanes and what the hurricane
science community is actually saying, I focus here on the core assertions about
temperature made by the IPCC in its 2007 Report.
1. Questions about the Measurement of Land Surface Temperature Trends
The global mean temperature data that the IPCC reports are a particular
temperature dataset put together and jointly maintained by the Climatic Research Unit
(CRU) at the University of East Anglia and the United Kingdom Meteorological Office’s
Hadly Center, a dataset known by the acronym Had CRUT. This dataset extends back to
1850.25 The data are published as monthly averages, which in turn are formed from daily
averages. A daily average is computed as the midpoint between the nighttime minimum
and daytime maximum temperature. From the mid 1950’s to the mid 1990’s, nighttime
minimum daily surface temperatures in this dataset have risen about twice as fast as
daytime maximum daily surface temperatures.26 What is important to see is that most of
the increase in global daily average surface temperature that is reported by the IPCC is
due to an increase in nighttime minimum temperatures27 -- that is, daytime maximums
have not increased by much over the period reported on by the IPCC.
Over land, the surface temperatures in this dataset are measured at between 1.5
and 2 meters (between about 5 and 7 feet) above ground at official weather stations, sites
run for various scientific purposes, and by volunteer observers.28 Now typically, the
daily maximum temperature occurs during the daytime. During the daytime, when there
is lots of vertical mixing of air, temperatures at even the relatively low 1.5-2 meter height
are representative of temperatures higher up in the troposphere and are thus a good proxy
for the “content of a substantial mass of the lower atmosphere.”29 Thus the daily
maximum temperature proxies the temperature of a large quantity of air. This is not true
of daily minimum temperatures, which typically occur during the nighttime. At night, the
air is typically much less turbulent and there is a large temperature change (gradient) as
one increases in height above the surface. For this reason, a minimum temperature
24
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26
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measured at only 1.5-2 meters above the ground represents the temperature of only a very
shallow layer of air and is extremely sensitive to land surface properties that affect
turbulence near the surface. At the typical 1.5-2 m observational height, anything that
impacts mixing between very low and higher layers of air may have an enormous impact
on such nighttime temperatures.30 For instance, at this height (compared with even a few
meters higher), nighttime minimums are much lower on calm nights than on windy
nights. Importantly, anything that causes increased turbulence (and more mixing with
higher layers) in this bottom nighttime layer of air will tend to increase minimum
nighttime temperatures.31 Among the things that could cause such increased turbulence
are trees or buildings (by increasing surface roughness),32 things leading to increased
surface heat capacity, such as irrigation and pavement,33 and anything that causes
enhanced downward longwave radiation and hence more downward nighttime mixing of
warm air, such as increases in water vapor and thermally active aerosols.34
Now if one were certain that over the period from the 1950’s to the 1990’s, there
had been no systematic trend in the vicinity of surface temperature observation stations in
any of these very basic land use and atmospheric variables, then one can confidently say,
as does the IPCC, that there is no need worry that things like the urban heat island effect
have caused an overestimate (upward bias) in the supposed increase in temperatures over
this period. Global warming scientists have attempted to correct the observed surface
temperature dataset for changes that might be expected to have caused an upward bias in
temperature trend data, such as the urban heat island effect (this is referred to as insuring
that the temperature trend data are homogeneous).35 They apply a set of adjustments to
what they deem to be non-spatially representative observations, which includes other
observations that are temporally and geographically proximate.36 Such adjustments
typically involve estimating a linear regression equation with many regional temperature
observation points, and avoiding using observations that are outliers in the sense that they
are far from the regression line. However, such homogeneity correction techniques
cannot offset a bias in temperature measurements caused by a shared upward trend in the
key factors that might be expected to introduce a warm bias into the minimum nighttime
30

See B.J.H. Van de Wiel et al., Intermittent turbulence and oscillations in the stable boundary layer over
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R.T. McNider et al., On the predictability of the stable atmospheric boundary layer, 52 J. Atmos. Sci.
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1.5 – 2 meter temperature trend -- such as increased irrigation and development, and the
resultant changes in the vertical mixing of heat by turbulence. To be more concrete, if
over the period 1950-1990, an entire area – consisting of a number of temperature
observation stations – had been subject to increasing development including irrigation,
plus increasing forcing due to increases in atmospheric water vapor content and/or
aerosols from pollution, then it would not be possible to adequately eliminate
“inhomogeneities” in the temperature dataset by these adjustments. Such observational
trends would be tainted.
There is substantial evidence for long term differences in the time trend of daily
minimum and maximum temperatures. In a number of places, ranging from north
Alabama37 and central California38 to East Africa,39 Christy et al. have found pronounced
differences in the time trend of daily minimum and daily maximum temperatures, with no
significant increase in daily maximum temperatures over this period (and various subperiods) but a large and statistically significant increase in daily minimum temperatures.
These results contrast sharply with recent work40 by teams including IPCC lead authors
that has showed that over the period 1979-2004, daily maximum and minimum surface
temperatures both warmed at nearly the same rate. However, for East Africa, it appears
that the increase in daily minimum temperatures found by the IPCC teams was derived
entirely from a single temperature observation station located at the airport in Nairobi,
Kenya.41
There seems to be more and more evidence that there has indeed been a
systematic trend upward since 1950 in the kind of variables that would have caused
nighttime minimum temperatures to overstate actual surface warming. In California,
Christy et al. found that while there was a significant increase in daily minimum
temperatures over their study period in the Central Valley, where large land use changes
occurred, there was no such increase in the foothills and the Sierras, where there was
much less land development. Similarly, Mahmood et al.42 found an increase in daily
minimum temperatures in irrigated areas of the Great Plains but no significant increase in
non-irrigated areas in that region. Over an even larger region of the U.S., looking at
stations representing areas for which various temperature inhomogeneities had been
removed using the same methods employed by IPCC lead authors, significant warming
trends were found at over 90% of the observation stations after periods of change in the
37
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dominant type of land cover. 43 Further evidence for potential bias in the increase in land
surface temperatures comes from the finding of Klotzbach et al. of a significantly greater
increase in minimum than maximum temperatures in high latitude areas, where boundary
layers are shallower and have a proportionally larger response due to changes in the
vertical turbulent mixing of heat.
2. Long-Term Temperature Trends: Basic Questions about Global Warming
Scientific methodology Raised by The “Hockey-Stick”Affair
Especially prominent in the presentation style and structure of the IPCC’s 2001
Assessment Report was the so-called “hockey stick,” a graph depicting global mean
surface temperatures back to the year 1000 which dramatically showed that mean global
surface temperature had remained roughly stable until the twentieth century, when it
rapidly began ascending. The hockey stick graph appeared six times at various places in
the IPCC’s 2001 Assessment Report, repeatedly and prominently displayed to support the
IPCC’s 2001 assertion that in the Northern Hemisphere “the 1990’s has been the warmest
decade and 1998 the warmest year of the millennium.”44
In the IPCC’s 2007 Assessment Report, there is no hockey stick graph. Instead,
in the 2007 Report one finds a relatively complex time series consisting of a large
number of attempted reconstructions of past climate that tend to show that 20th century
temperatures were high, but no higher than temperatures during the medieval warm
period of roughly 1000 years ago.45 Still, in both the Summary for Policymakers and
Technical Summary, the IPCC asserts that “[a]verage Northern Hemisphere temperatures
during the second half of the 20th century were very likely higher than during any other
50-year period in the last 500 years and likely the highest in at least the last 1,300 years.
Some recent studies indicate…that cooler periods existed in the 12th to 14th, 17th and 19th
centuries.”46
Why would the IPCC both delete the famous (or infamous) hockey-stick graph
and yet continue to assert (albeit with lessened confidence) that 20th century temperatures
were the highest in the last 1,300 years? According to the IPCC, after the 2001
Assessment Report had come out, McIntyre and McKitrick reported that they were
unable to replicate the hockey stick results found by Mann et al.47, and had “raised further
concerns” about the technique (principal components analysis) that Mann et al. had used
to extract the “dominant modes of variability present in a network of western North
American tree ring chronologies.”48 Despite this, the IPCC says, other researchers had
43
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shown that by using the correct “implementation,” they could replicate the original
hockey stick data; that even if Mann et al.’s methods were flawed, they had only a minor
(.05 degrees C) impact on reconstructed temperatures; and, finally, that there have been a
large number of new proxy temperature reconstructions using regional averaging
methods and statistical “transfer functions,” methods that “preserve multi-decadal and
centennial time scale variability” in tree-ring and bore hole data used to reconstruct past
temperatures.49 While the IPCC now admits that their proxy temperature reconstructions
are too uncertain to “gauge the significance, or precedence, of the extreme warm years
observed in the recent instrumental record, such as 1998 and 2005, in the context of the
last millennium,” it believes that the “weight of the current multi-proxy evidence”
supports its basic conclusion that the 20th century was “likely” the warmest in the last
1,300 years.50
Were one to take all of this at face value, one would think that while McIntyre
and McKitrick had pointed to a few problems with the original “hockey-stick” studies by
Mann et al., lots of new studies have been done and while there may be more uncertainty,
the basic story -- a “hockey stick” type relationship with unprecedentedly high and rising
temperatures in the 20th century – remains. A closer look at the “hockey stick”
controversy reveals instead some fundamental questions about the methodology
underlying long-term (paleoclimatic) temperature reconstructions and about the kind of
scientific process that the IPCC relies upon in reaching its conclusions. Since actual
temperature measurements extend only from the 19th century, when climate scientists
attempt to measure temperatures many centuries ago, they use proxies for temperature,
such as tree ring data. Tree ring widths are influenced by local temperature, and so if one
can appropriately control for other things that influence annual tree growth, tree ring data
can be used as a proxy for past temperatures. What McIntyre and McKitrick showed
was that the “hockey stick” temperature reconstruction derived by Mann et al. was due
entirely to using a statistical method for trend identification that essentially gave
enormous weight to a very few tree ring datasets that exhibited a 20th century hockey
stick – that is, growth spurts in the 20th century that could have been caused by
warming.51 More precisely, when they reanalyzed the data used by Mann et al., McIntyre
and McKitrick found that the upward 20th century temperature trend reported by Mann et
al. was due entirely to the application of a trend identification program to one particular
tree ring data series, a bristlecone pine tree ring dataset developed as part of a research
project undertaken in the 1980’s. In published articles, the researchers who developed
the bristlecone pine dataset themselves had said that the 20th century growth spurt found
in that data did not match local temperature trends and probably was instead due to CO2
fertilization.52
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McIntyre and McKitrick’s was not the only critique of the Mann et al. “hockey
stick” studies. An unrelated team of researchers led by von Storch used climate models
to generate estimates of temperatures over the past millennium (so-called “pseudoproxies”) and found that the methods employed by Mann et al. failed to take into account
the long term persistence of temperatures (generating what is called statistical “red
noise”) and so severely underestimated the long term variability of climate.53 This failure
to properly take into account long term persistence of climate trends while using
regression methods on 20th century data to “calibrate” the proxy measures can be shown
to itself generate a “hockey stick” type graph for long-term temperatures.54
Mann et al. have responded to the criticism of their work and presented what they
say are improved, statistically robust proxy reconstructions of past temperatures,55 and
the debate between Mann et al. and their critics in fact continues today.56 While one’s
view as to which side has the better of the debate turns significantly on issues of
statistical methodology, the debate itself brings to light several important and disturbing
features of global warming science. The first and perhaps most important thing is simply
to recognize that there is a debate about where 20th century temperatures fall in relation to
temperatures over the past millenium. As with any debate, there are clearly sides, with
scientists allied with the IPCC, such as Mann, on one side, and other climate scientists,
such as von Storch, on the other. For example, Stefan Rahmstorf, an IPCC lead author,
argued in a short “Letter” published in Science magazine that von Storch et al. were
wrong to think that their results actually tended to cast doubt on the Mann et al. hockey
stick.57 Von Storch et al. replied that Rahmstorf’s reply itself “illustrates a common
confusion in our field…We showed that the [Mann et al.] method implemented in the
simulations leads to pseudoreconstructed temperatures being too warm and with
differences from the target temperature larger than our calibration uncertainty ranges.”58
What this means is that the Mann et al.’s method tended to exaggerate the pronounced
upward trend in twentieth century temperatures that gives the “hockey stick” graph its
name.
The second general lesson from the hockey-stick debate is that it indicates a
seeming tendency by establishment climate science to systematically underestimate
uncertainty, a tendency that may partly be related to what seems to be a relative lack of
knowledge and expertise with statistical methodology, as well as a bias in favor of
reporting results that will prove useful in future IPCC assessments. For example, at
Congressional urging, the National Academy of Science convened an inquiry into the
53

Hans von Storch et al., Reconstructing Past Climate from Noisy Data, 306 Science 679 (2004).
This point is demonstrated elegantly and simply by David R.B. Stockwell, Reconstruction of Past
Climate Using Series with red Noise, 8 AIG News 314 (2006).
55
Michael E. Mann et al, Proxy-based reconstructions of hemispheric and global surface temperature over
the past two millennia, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci USA 13252 (2008).
56
Compare, for instance, Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick, Proxy Inconsistency and other problems
in millennial paleoclimate reconstructions, 106 Proceed. Nat’l Acad. Sci. USA E10 (2009) with Michael E.
Mann et al., Reply to McIntyre and McKitrick: Proxy-Based Temperature Reconstructions are Robus, 106
Proceed. Nat’l Acad. Sci. USA E11 (2009).
57
Stefan Rahmstorf, Testing Climate Reconstructions, 312 Science 1872 (2006).
58
Haus von Storch et al, Response, 312 Science 1872 (2006).
54

17

Mann et al. “hockey stick.” While the National Research Council (NRC) report
concluded that while it could be said with a “high level of confidence” that global mean
temperatures “were higher during the last few decades of the 20th century than during any
comparable period during the preceding four centuries,…less confidence can be placed in
large-scale surface temperature reconstructions for the period from A.D. 900 to 1600.”59
According to a Science news story, when questioned, members of the NRC committee
that authored the report opined that they had concluded that Mann et al. “had
underestimated the uncertainty” in distant temperature reconstructions, that “[i]n fact, the
uncertainties aren’t fully quantified,” but the committee thought it was “more at the level
of 2:1 odds” that 20th century temperatures were the warmest over the last 1,000 years.60
With particular reference to the criticisms raised by McIntyre and McKitrick, the
National Research Council report concluded that “taken together, they are an important
aspect of a more general finding of this committee, which is that uncertainties of the
published reconstructions have been underestimated.”61 As for statistical methodology, a
report by a group of statisticians commissioned by two committees of Congress was more
blunt, stating that the original Mann et al. work had “misused” the statistical trend
detection technique (called “principal components analysis”) that it had relied upon.62
3. The Missing Signature: Ongoing Data Disputes and the Failure to Consistently
Find Differential Tropospheric Warming
The lapse rate is the rate at which a packet of air cools as it rises in the
atmosphere. On a global scale, this cooling rate is determined by radiative processes
(short wave radiation downward from the sun, longwave radiation upward from the
earth’s surface) and large scale dynamical processes and convection in the atmosphere.63
In the tropics, the lapse rate closely follows the moist adiabatic lapse rate, which is the
rate that a water-saturated air packet cools (due to reduced pressure) as it rises. The
moist adiabatic lapse rate decreases with increasing surface temperature.64 Hence,
climate models that predict an increase in surface temperature also predict that the
tropical lapse rate will fall relative to the rate that prevails before a ghg-induced surface
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warming.65 This in turn implies that in the tropics, any given surface warming will be
amplified in the troposphere. For example, using arbitrary lapse rates for purposes of
demonstration, if the prior lapse rate between the surface and a given level of the
troposphere was ½, so that a 1 degree temperature increase at the surface would translate
into a ½ degree warming at the given level of the troposphere, then if the lapse rate fell to
1/3, then a 1 degree increase in temperature at the surface would translate into a 2/3
degree increase in temperature at the given level of the tropical troposphere. The
prediction of amplified warming in the tropical troposphere relative to the tropical surface
is one of the central empirically testable propositions generated by climate models.
In the chapter of its 2007 AR4 entitled “Understanding and Attributing Climate
Change,” the IPCC notes that in the tropics, “where most models have more warming
aloft than at the surface…most observational estimates show more warming at the surface
than in the troposphere.”66 In other words, what the IPCC is saying rather obliquely here
is that a crucial empirically testable proposition generated by climate models – that there
should be more warming in the tropical troposphere than at the surface -- has not been
confirmed by the existing data. Now there are two possibilities: either the data are bad,
or something is wrong with the models. In its 2007 report, the IPCC is quite clear that
the data, not the models, must be the problem. The IPCC explains that since on short
term time scales (monthly and annual), variations in tropical surface temperatures are
indeed amplified in tropospheric observed temperature as the models predict, the fact that
on longer time scales only one data set is consistent with the models’ predictions means
that the observational record must be afflicted by “inhomogeneities,” that is, that there
are errors in tropical tropospheric temperature observations.67
In the Summary for Policymakers accompanying the 2007 AR4, no mention is
made of the potentially quite troubling discrepancy between model predictions and
observations in the tropical troposphere relative to the surface. In the “Technical
Summary” accompanying the full report, the IPCC says that there are likely errors in all
of the existing measurements of tropospheric temperature trends, but stresses that many
errors have been eliminated since the previous 2001 AR, leading to improved
tropospheric temperature estimates and a “tropospheric temperature record…broadly
consistent with surface temperature trends…”68 Hence according to the IPCC’s 2007
report, progress was continuing to be made in getting more accurate measurements of
tropospheric temperature trends, and the more accurate measurements confirmed model
predictions. It was bad measurement, not bad models, that had created earlier
discrepancies.
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It seems clear, however, that even before that IPCC’s 2007 AR appeared, a
number of articles appeared in the top peer-edited geophysical journals in which climate
scientists presented what they believed to be reliable tropospheric temperature data
disconfirming the climate model prediction that tropical tropospheric temperatures will
increase by more than tropical surface temperatures.69 Perhaps even more significantly,
the publication of the IPCC’s AR4 in 2007 has not ended the controversy, but seems to
have merely heightened it. In 2008, Douglass et al.70 showed that certain satellite and
balloon-based measurements of tropical surface and tropospheric temperature trends had
measured tropospheric temperature trends that were more than two standard deviations
away from those predicted by the mean linear trend estimate generated by climate models
that predicted surface temperature trends well; in the very same issue of the very same
journal, a group of authors lead by Benjamin Santer and constituting a virtual “who’s
who” of leading IPCC climate modelers published an article71 in which they looked at
completely different satellite and balloon-based temperature data and found that the
linear trend in tropical tropospheric temperatures was well within two standard deviations
from mean72 trend estimates from a suite of no fewer than 49 individual climate models
as well as within two standard deviations of the mean estimated linear trend when
standard deviations were properly inflated.73 Finally, an even more recent paper by a
third group of researchers, unrelated to the Douglass and Santer groups, examined yet a
third, newer dataset on tropospheric temperature, and (employing a climate model that is
calibrated on a 500 year dataset and which captures the periodic ENSO-induced cycles in
tropical temperatures) found that the observations did not confirm the model’s prediction
of differential warming in the tropical troposphere (versus tropical sea surface
temperatures).74
The authors of these various articles differ both in the measurements of tropical
tropospheric temperature that they deem to be reliable, in the climate models they test
against observations, and in the statistical methods employed to detect differences
between the trends predicted by models and the trends actually measured. Especially on
the former two questions – of which tropospheric temperature observations are to be
given credence and which climate models tested– it is very difficult for a layperson to
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make any sort of judgment whatsoever.75 What one can see quite clearly, however, is an
enormous gap between ongoing controversies in the peer-edited climate literature and
the IPCC’s confident assertions in the 2007 AR4 that errors in satellite and balloon-based
temperature observations were quickly being corrected leading to increasing confidence
that observations confirmed climate models’ prediction of more warming in the tropical
troposphere than tropical surface. It seems instead that there are continuing
disagreements over which temperature observations are reliable and how to test them
against model predictions.
B. Crucial Shrouded Assumptions and Limitations of Climate Model Projections
Perhaps the most important and yet generally downplayed fact about climate
models is that although the last thirty years have seen a huge increase in computing
power, in climate observations, and in the number of climate modelers, climate model
predictions have changed hardly at all. In the 1970’s, the predicted equilibrium global
mean temperature increase resulting from a doubling of atmospheric CO2 relative to
preindustrial levels was between 1.6 and 4.5 degrees centigrade; in the 2007 IPCC
Assessment Report, the predicted range of likely temperature increase is now between 2
and 4.5 degrees centigrade.76 As climate scientist Stephen Schwartz summarizes the
relatively lack of scientific progress on this issue, “…despite extensive research neither
the best estimate nor the estimated range for Earth’s climate sensitivity has changed
markedly in the last 39 years.”77
In terms of their policy significance, there are three even more important features of
climate change models that are not commonly known and which climate scientists
virtually never even mention in presentations or work intended for the more general
public: 1) that although various positive feedbacks account for the high temperature
increases that would generate large amounts of harm, so little is known about many of
these feedback mechanisms that the most important positive feedbacks could actually be
negative – cooling the planet – rather than enhancing warming; 2) climate models do not
agree on how sensitive the climate is to increases in CO2 and manage to replicate
twentieth century temperature trends only by inferring whatever aerosol cooling effect is
necessary to “explain” observed temperatures; and, 3) the most concrete and therefore
policy-relevant projections of climate change models, about what global warming will
mean in particular regions of the world – hinge entirely upon predictions about how a
warming climate will cause changes in global circulation patterns, but the models do not
agree at all on how such circulation patterns will change.
1. Concealed Complexity: The Positive Feedbacks Presumed by Climate Models
Account Entirely for very High Projected Future Temperature Increases
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A crucial but apparently little known feature of climate models is that the higher
end temperature change predictions are not caused by CO2 emissions but by positive
climate feedbacks built into the models – without feedbacks, a doubling of CO2 leads to a
predicted increase of only about 1.2 degrees centigrade.78 Perhaps even more
importantly, it has recently been shown that models will always attach some positive
probability to very high possible temperature increases because “the sum of the
underlying climate feedbacks is substantially positive.”79 That is, climate model
predictions will always be very uncertain, and skewed toward high temperature increases,
and “foreseeable improvements in the understanding of physical processes, and in the
estimation of their effects from observations, will not yield large reductions in the
envelope of climate sensitivity.”80 Even if we significantly improve our understanding of
the various climate feedback processes – narrowing our uncertainty regarding their
individual impacts – this will have “little effect” in making more certain the predicted
sensitivity of climate to CO2 doubling: the models will still say that potentially very high
temperature increases are possible (in the sense of occurring with positive probability).81
These results are elegantly derived in a recent paper by Roe and Baker, who show
how the predominance of positive feedbacks in climate models logically and necessarily
means that those models will always attach some positive probability to very high
temperature increases due to CO2 forcing. To put this in a more policy-relevant way,
consider the general belief that there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
temperature increase likely to result from a doubling of CO2, and that there is some
chance – however small and difficult to estimate – of catastrophically large surface
temperature increases in the 5 – 10 degree Celsius range. What Roe and Baker show is
that the possibility of catastrophic temperature increases is not the output of climate
analysis but is an input, in that it is a direct logical consequence of the climate models’
assumption of a net positive feedback from CO2 – induced global warming. The
prediction that catastrophically large temperature increases may result is due to assuming
a big positive feedback effect, not from some known climatic mechanism.
In the very same issue of Science magazine in which Roe and Baker’s article
appeared was included a response by leading climate modelers Myles Allen and David
Frame, the former of whom served respectively as a contributing author and as Review
Editor on the two key chapters of the IPCC’s 2007 AR dealing with the modeled
attribution of ongoing climate change and with future projections.82 Allen and Frame’s
response did not fundamentally challenge the mathematical points that Roe and Baker are
making: those points follow quite directly from the basic mathematical structure of the
climate prediction problem, and are not controversial.83 On the statistical structure of
climate models, Allen and Frame indeed pointed out that variations in certain statistical
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assumptions could lead to even higher upper bounds on predicted temperature
increases.84 Rather than challenging Roe and Baker’s scientific point – a point about the
basic statistical structure of climate models – Allen and Frame instead argue that Roe and
Baker’s point is really not very important, because the goal of “avoiding dangerous
anthropogenic interference in the climate system” does not mean that we have to be able
to “specify today a stabilization concentration of carbon dioxide…for which the risk of
dangerous warming is acceptably low.”85 What Allen and Frame argue is that if in the
future, people adapt target atmospheric CO2 concentration levels by taking the future
current (say 2050) concentration level (say 450 ppm) and multiplying by the (inverse)
ratio of observed to predicted warming at that concentration level, then by adjusting
target concentration levels down if warming is greater than predicted, they will never
actually observe the very large temperature increases. As they put it: “[i]f [climate
sensitivity S turns out to be toward the upper end of the current uncertainty range, we
may never find out what it is…[b]ut provided our descendants have the sense to adapt
their policies to the emerging climate change signal, they probably won’t care.” Hence
Allen and Frame say that it is time to “call off the quest” for what has previously been
considered the “holy grail” of climate research, “[a]n upper bound on climate
sensitivity.”86 As for policy, what is most important on their argument is that future
target concentration levels adapt and that “we resist the temptation to fix a concentration
target early on. Once fixed, it may be politically impossible to reduce it.”87
There are several rather odd things about Allen and Frame’s response. First, their
response quite thoroughly mixes science and policy, basically arguing that scientific
uncertainty won’t matter if future policy ignores the uncertainty and uses the models’
predictions to adjust down CO2 emissions (and concentration levels) if observed
temperatures exceed predicted temperatures. But of course the problem is that it requires
that policymakers use a model to adjust policy that observations have proven to generate
incorrect predictions. In particular, if a model under-predicts temperature change over a
certain period given stabilization of CO2 at a particular level, then is it true that the model
also likely under-predicted the longer term response to that concentration? If so,
policymakers might use the current error as the best guess as to future error, and adjust
targets accordingly. But this implicitly assumes that it is very unlikely that a model
would under-predict the short term temperature increase while accurately or overpredicting the long term temperature increase. But the question is, how much
information do short term temperature changes show about the likely long-term
equilibrium temperature response. If they show a lot, then Allen and Frame are correct;
but if the short term response really reveals little about the likely accuracy of long term
predictions, then the adaptive strategy they imagine would essentially be to react to short
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term temperature changes for their own sake, to go “off model” as it were even though
the short term temperature changes showed little.
Perhaps even more problematic is Allen and Frame’s really quite perplexing
comment that “[o]paque decisions about statistical methods, which no data can ever
resolve, have a substantial impact on headline results.”88 Of course, all kinds of
“opaque” methodological choices can substantially impact “headline results,” but this
does not mean that methodology is irrelevant from a scientific point of view. What
traditional philosophy of science teaches is that decisions about the appropriate statistical
method should be based on the data; however, on this, Allen and Frame easily concede
that “no data can ever resolve” the statistical choices at the heart of climate modeling.
But this is true only of the genre of climate models considered by Roe and Baker: that is,
models in which positive feedbacks predominate.
To be sure, the Science article by Roe and Baker that I have been discussing
appeared a few months after the release of the IPCC’s 2007 AR, and so it is perhaps not
surprising that the 2007 AR failed to cite to the Roe and Baker paper. Interestingly,
however, the IPCC’s 2007 AR does eventually note that differences in climate model
sensitivity are due to differences in how what models assume about feedback effects –
primarily the cloud feedback effect discussed in more detail below.89 But that notation is
made in the context of a discussion concerned with explaining why GCM’s come up with
quite widely varying sensitivities, and no mention is made in the 2007 AR about how the
assumed positive feedbacks virtually create the possibility of very high temperature
increases (very high model sensitivity). Indeed, in the IPCC AR4 “Climate Science”
documents intended to influence the public and the media – the Policymaker Summary
and Technical Summary – no mention whatsoever is made of the positive feedback
effects that account for projected temperature increases above 1.2 degrees C.
The obvious question raised by Roe and Baker’s 2007 paper is whether the positive
likelihood of very high temperature increases from CO2 doubling that they show is a
necessary consequence of the models’ assumption of strong positive feedbacks would be
present even if there were important negative feedbacks. A more recent paper by Baker
and Roe90 answers this question, and shows also that Allen and Frame were perhaps too
gloomy about the possibility of getting some more precise mathematical insight into how
learning about climate change feedbacks might progress over time. The first thing shown
by Baker and Roe is that – as one would have expected intuitively – the addition of an
important negative feedback causes the probability of large temperature increases due to
CO2 forcing to fall, with probability concentrating instead around more moderate
temperature increases. As a corollary, when there is a negative feedback, reducing
uncertainty in positive atmospheric feedbacks does have a “significant” impact in
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reducing uncertainty about the ultimate (or equilibrium) temperature increase.91 As for
the timing of learning about climate sensitivity, Baker and Roe show that when there is a
negative feedback that dissipates only very slowly, then even for a known forcing (e.g.
CO2 increase) there is enormous uncertainty over how long it will take for large
temperature increases to be realized (while smaller temperature increases should, with
very high probability occur quite quickly, e.g. around 100 years for a 1 degree C
increase).
Taken together, the papers by Baker and Roe would seem to indicate that getting
better empirical evidence on the direction and magnitude of crucial climate feedbacks is
absolutely essential for projections of the sensitivity of global climate to increasing ghg
concentrations. As for the positive feedbacks that predominate in the current set of
climate models, the most straightforward and biggest positive feedback in climate models
is due to increased water vapor.92 Due to various assumptions about convection,
turbulent transfer and the deposition of latent heat within various levels of the
atmosphere, the climate models relied upon by the IPCC all generate relatively constant
relative humidity (amount of water vapor in the air divided by the saturation water vapor
amount at the higher temperatures) at different levels of the troposphere even as the
troposphere warms due to increasing CO2.93 Since air holds more water (the saturation
vapor pressure of air increases) as temperature goes up, the climate models imply that
water vapor increases with warming temperatures. There are large differences in the size
of the water vapor response across different climate models,94 but the predicted increase
in water vapor is crucial to the size of predicted global warming, because it is estimated
that water vapor is 14 times more powerful a greenhouse gas than CO2.95 With constant
relative humidity, and a large water feedback, as generated by climate models, predicted
surface temperature increases always exceed 1 degree Celsius; if there were instead
substantial decreases in tropospheric relative humidity (evidence for which is discussed
below), then the temperature increase from CO2 doubling would be more in the range of
.5 degree centigrade, or less than 1 degree Farenheit.96
Water vapor is closely related to another crucial feedback in climate models,
clouds. Cloud formation, and the impact of a warmer, wetter atmosphere on cloud
formation is simply not yet understood. While I discuss the significance of this
fundamental uncertainty about cloud feedbacks in much more detail below, suffice it for
the present to note for the present purpose that according to one recent and widely
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influential review essay, the assumption in climate models that global mean temperature
determines cloud feedback effects is essentially without foundation:
“we have no clear theory that suggests the accumulated effects of cloud feedbacks
are in any way a function of global-mean temperature or, as posed, T…the
(usually unstated) assumptions about the nature of the system and its feedbacks,
and how feedback processes relate specifically to surface temperature, dictate
almost entirely the quantitative results from climate feedback analysis. This is
alarming as…different assumptions about the system, applied to the same model
output, produce feedback measures that not only differ in magnitude but also in
sign.”97
In the next section, I discuss recent empirical findings that seem to case substantial doubt
on whether climate change models are accurately predicting both the positive water vapor
feedback effect and the positive cloud feedback effect.
2. Obscuring Fundamental Disagreement Across Climate Models in both
Explanations of Past Climate and Predictions of Future Climate
Confidence in future climate projections generated by computer-based Coupled
Ocean Atmosphere General Circulation Models (or GCM’s for short) is based largely on
the purported ability of such models to accurately match temperatures actually observed,
especially those observed since the 1970’s. However, the IPCC Assessment Report fails
to openly reveal several crucial features about the purported agreement between modeled
and observed past temperatures. Prominent among these is the fact that the models
disagree in very major and fundamental ways in how they manage to account for past
observed temperatures and climate patterns. Climate modelers are well aware of these
problems with the models, and themselves say that the disagreements are so fundamental
that they preclude the kind of certainty in future projections expressed by the IPCC.98
The first and perhaps most central way in which climate models disagree is in how
they account for the two primary factors that determine global warming: the strength of
climate forcing, and the sensitivity of global temperature to such forcing. Now by a
“forcing,” climatologists mean pretty much any external influence – external, that is, to
the intrinsic variability of the non-linear climate system itself – that can impact the
amount of solar radiation that reaches the surface and/or the amount of longwave (or
infared) radiation that is emitted from the top of the troposphere. Climate forcings include
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both anthropogenic and natural influences.99 The primary natural forcings are volcanic
eruptions and solar variation. Anthropogenic forcings include not only the emissions of
all the various greenhouse gases – including not only CO2 but also methane (CH4) and
nitrous oxide (N2O) and chloroflourocarbons (CFC’s) – but also changes in land use that
alter the earth’s surface albedo (or reflectivity). In addition to the warming greenhouse
gases there is another kind of anthropogenic forcing that is crucial to climate models: the
emission of aerosols, such as the fine particulates contained in sulfur dioxide emissions
from coal-burning industrial facilities. Unlike greenhouse gases, that warm the earth by
reducing the emission of longwave radiation back into space, climate models presume
that aerosols cool the earth, both by directly reflecting solar radiation back to space
before it has a chance to reach the earth’s surface and by increasing the reflectivity of low
level clouds.100
As discussed above, climate sensitivity means the sensitivity of global mean
temperature to various natural and anthropogenic forcings. Also as previously discussed,
in any given climate model, sensitivity depends upon what the builders of the model have
assumed about various feedback effects -- most prominently, how clouds and water vapor
respond to an increase in surface temperature. The basic relationship between various
climate forcings and a predicted temperature change can be expressed quite simply, as:
∆T

=

S∆Q – H,

(1)

Where ∆T is the predicted change in temperature, ∆Q is the total forcing, S is the
sensitivity of temperature with respect to such forcing, and H is the amount of heat that is
stored in the oceans.101
Now it is a demonstrated mathematical fact that climate models differ tremendously
in what they assume about various climate feedbacks and so also in their value for
climate sensitivity, S; indeed, models differ by a factor of 2 to 3, or 200 to 300%, in their
climate sensitivity.102As for the climate forcings, the main problem is that while “there
are established data for the time evolution of the well-mixed greenhouse gases, there are
no established standard datasets for ozone, aerosols, or natural forcing factors.”103
Uncertainty regarding the possible level of past forcings is indeed so great that the
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report gives a range of between .6 and 2.4 watts/meter
squared – or a factor of 4 or 400% -- for anthropogenic forcings.104 Now given that the
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models differ hugely in their climate sensitivity, the combined uncertainty, due to the
product of both forcing uncertainty and sensitivity uncertainty, ought to be larger than
either type of uncertainty alone. In other words, the variation in the past temperature
record predicted by climate models “would be expected to be larger than that arising from
the uncertainty in the forcing as it would also reflect uncertainties arising from the
differences in the multiple climate models used.”105 However, “[c]ontrary to such an
expectation, the range in modeled global mean temperature change…is much smaller
than that associated with the forcings, which is a factor of four.”106 In other words, and in
terms of equation (1), even though the models have widely varying climate sensitivities,
S, and little is known about the forcings, ∆Q, the models are all pretty close in simulating
past temperature changes, ∆T.
The answer to the obvious question – “How can this be?”107 – has been supplied by
recent research clearing showing that climate modelers pair high sensitivity with low
forcing coefficients, and vice versa. There is a “strong inverse correlation between total
anthropogenic forcing used for the 20th century and the model’s climate sensitivity.
Indicating that models with low climate sensitivity require a relatively higher total
anthropogenic forcing than models with higher climate sensitivity (sic).”108 In other
words, the reason why “models with such diverse climate sensitivity can all simulate the
[late twentieth century] anomaly in surface temperature” is because the model builders
choose the “magnitude of applied anthropogenic total forcing” so as to “compensate” for
the model’s sensitivity parameter S.109 More precisely, the nearly threefold range in the
magnitude of (climate cooling) aerosol forcing assumed by major climate models causes
a similarly wide range in total anthropogenic forcing assumed by such models.110
Further, and perhaps most strikingly,
“[i]n many models aerosol forcing is not applied as an external forcing, but is
calculated as an integral component of the system. Many current models predict
aerosol concentrations interactively within the climate model and this
concentration is then used to predict the direct and indirect forcing effects on the
climate system.”111
But remember that aerosols are emissions from human activities, not something
generated by the climate system itself. Hence models that are deriving aerosol
concentrations “interactively…within the climate model” are essentially calculating a
value for the forcing, ∆Q, that allows the model to predict late 20th century warming,
given the model’s presumed climate sensitivity S.
The issue at hand is whether the observational record could, in principle, be used to
test a climate model’s assumption that the climate has high sensitivity to forcings such as
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CO2 increases. By using compensating parameters for forcing and sensitivity, climate
modelers guarantee that such testing against the observational record cannot happen:
models are effectively immunized from empirical challenge. More precisely, as Retto
Knutti, a contributing author to the IPCC’s 2007 AR112 explained in a paper published
after that report’s publication, “models with high sensitivity (strong feedbacks) avoid
simulating too much warming by using a small net forcing (large negative aerosol
forcing), and models with weak feedbacks can still simulate the observed warming with a
larger forcing (weak aerosol forcing)…”113 Put slightly differently, the reason why the
major climate models can all reproduce the late 20th century warming pretty well even
though they don’t agree at all on the fundamental question of how climate responds to
various forcings (the parameter S in equation (1)) is because they make whatever
assumption about aerosols is necessary to adjust the radiative forcing ∆Q so as to be able
to reproduce temperature changes ∆T observed during the late 20th century.114 But these
assumptions are far from innocuous. As recent work has shown, if the (negative) aerosol
forcing turns out to be much smaller than assumed, then the ensemble of GCM’s used by
the IPCC would have to have a much larger climate sensitivity (with the mean moved up
a full 2 degrees centigrade) in order to remain consistent with observations. On the other
hand, if the negative aerosol forcing is even larger (more negative), then the ensemble
GCM’s would fail on the other side, simulating too little warming. This “mismatch”
between observed and simulated 20th century warming would mean that “current
agreement between simulated and observed warming trends would be partly spurious,
and indicate that we are missing something in the picture of causes and effects of large
scale 20th century surface warming.”115
Presumably there is a true or correct climate sensitivity parameter S. If so, then
some of the models are closer to the true climate sensitivity parameter S while others get
this way wrong. In determining present day policy, we should rely upon the future
climate projections from models with the most accurate number for climate sensitivity S.
But as things stand now with the climate modeling relied upon by the IPCC – where the
modelers simply get to choose whatever value for forcings, ∆Q, lets their model
reproduce past temperatures -- there is no way to tell which model is closest to the true S.
Most importantly, not only does the “narrow range of modeled temperatures give a false
sense of the certainty that has been achieved” in climate models:”116 There is no reason
to assume that the model that most closely reproduces past temperatures is by any means
the most accurate representation of the reality (the key parameter S) of the climate
system.
Climate modelers have some ideas about how we should respond to this state of
affairs, and how it came about. In terms of response, one idea proposed by several
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modelers is that climate models would be tested by having all the models make the same
assumption about twentieth century forcings and then comparing how they do at
reproducing twentieth century temperatures.117Other ideas -- much more difficult
computationally – are to test the models over the “full range” of possible forcing values
or to narrow the range of possible forcings (in other words, “constrain the forcings.”)118
The state of the art in climate modeling, to be clear, is one in which the ability of a
model to reproduce the late 20th century warming is not informative as to whether or not
that model has accurately modeled the feedbacks that will primarily determine the
sensitivity of climate to increases in CO2 and other greenhouse gases. As for how such a
state of the art developed, climate modelers have had some rather interesting and
revealing things to say. Intuitively enough, one climate scientist has recently observed
that:
“While it is impossible to know what decisions are made in the development
process of each model, it seems plausible that choices are made based on agreement
with observations as to what parameterizations are used, what forcing datasets are
selected, or whether an uncertain forcing (e.g. mineral dust, land use change) or
feedback (indirect aerosol effect) is incorporated or not. …[m]odels differ because
of their underlying assumptions and parameterizations, and it is plausible that
choices are made based on the model’s ability to simulate observed trends.” 119
That the models are essentially using aerosol parameterizations to offset variations
in presumed climate sensitivity is far from an innocuous technical detail. As Richard
Lindzen has explained, because a high climate sensitivity implies (other things equal) a
big CO2 – induced warming, in order to have significant policy relevance, climate models
“cling” to high climate sensitivities.120 And yet as just discussed here, the sensitivities
are so high that the models simulate too much 20th century warming. To get a better
reproduction of past temperatures, the models cancel out about half of simulated warming
by imposing a compensating assumption about the cooling effect of aerosols. But then
apparently to preserve “alarm” about the future, climate models assume that the aerosols
will soon disappear.121 Even if the models are correct that aerosols have had a net
cooling effect in the twentieth century,122 this series of parameter adjustments and
assumptions about future changes in aerosols can hardly inspire confidence in climate
models.
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C. Distracting Attention from Empirical Studies Tending to Disconfirm Key Predictions
of Climate Models and their Preferred Interpretation of Paleoclimatic Evidence
One of the most striking features of the established climate change story is the
seemingly increasing tendency to simply ignore even the most rigorous, peer-reviewed
scientific evidence when it tends to disconfirm either customary interpretations of paleoclimatic data or predictions of the coupled ocean-atmosphere general circulation models
(GCM’s) that are used to generate virtually all of the IPCC’s quantitative predictions.
1. The Ambiguous Paleoclimatic evidence on the Direction of Causality between
CO2 and Temperature
Consider first the long-term, or paleoclimatic relationship between CO2 and global
mean temperature. What seems to be clearly an undisputed finding from ice core data is
that over the broad 500 million year plus time frame of the Phanerozoic era, there has
been a positive correlation between atmospheric CO2 levels and global temperature.123
Even a casual review of the climate literature, however, reveals that there is far less
agreement on the direction of causality. That is, apparently cool and confident statements
such as this -- “the climatic impacts of CO2 variations are large enough that they appear
to be a primary driver over the Phenerozoic, rather than simply a passive response to
changing climate”124 – in fact conceal considerable uncertainty over the long-term (that
is, Phanerozoic era) causal contribution of changes in CO2 to changes in global
temperature. On the climate side, there is an apparently very methodologically robust
finding that over the last 600 million years, earth’s climate has cycled over periods of
about 135 million years between warm and cool modes.125 There is much less agreement
in attempts to reconstruct atmospheric CO2 levels over the entire Phanerozoic period126,
but the various reconstructions do agree that atmospheric CO2 levels have been low and
decreasing over the last 175 million years.127 As this period of time has also been a
period of cool global climate, for this most recent period, cool global climate and
relatively low levels of CO2 coincide.128 But over the Phanerozoic period as a whole, at
least one long-term CO2 reconstruction finds “no correspondence” between atmospheric
CO2 levels and global climate, while other studies find periods of up to 100 million years
when high levels of CO2were accompanied by cold temperatures in at least some regions
of the world129 (indeed so many such periods that one review has characterized this
finding as one of “perisistent Phanerozoic decorrelation”130 between tropical (lowlatitude) temperature and modeled CO2-induced radiative forcing).
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There are of course inherent problems in trying to explain the relationship between
CO2 and climate over the hundreds of millions of years of the Phanerozoic – among
others, the fact that tectonic forces have shifted not only continents but also global ocean
circulation patterns over this period.131 For some climatologists, given the “considerable
uncertainty” in both the model of how CO2 should be expected to influence climate over
such widely varying configurations and states of the planet as well as in proxy measures
of CO2 itself,132 “the first-order agreement between the CO2 record and continental
glaciation continues to support the conclusion that CO2 has played an important role in
long-term climate change.”133 This conclusory statement comes in a review article by
two climatologists whose work has consistently supported a climate-CO2 link for almost
two decades (and whose lead author in particular is very heavily cited by the IPCC in its
chapter on paleoclimate).134 And although they concede that “there are substantial gaps
in our understanding of how climate models distribute heat on the planet in response to
CO2 changes on tectonic time scales,” the fact that we need “better confidence” in the
paleoclimate data and that tectonic shifts seem to cause “unanticipated complications”
make it “hazardous to infer that existing discrepancies between models and data cloud
interpretations of future anthropogenic gas projections.”135
One should note how remarkable are these series of statements. After stating that
scientists really have no idea how CO2 might have affected climate in the “widely varying
configuration and states of the planet” that have prevailed over the past several hundred
million years, Crowley and Berner then say that because extremely crude and imprecise
proxy measures suggest a correlation between climate and CO2, we should continue to
presume that CO2 played a role in causing climate change. Absent any other showing,
this seems to be faith, not logic.
Crowley and Berner’s review article is very widely cited, yet the more typical and
(to my mind, at least) reasonable response of scientists arguing for the primacy of CO2 in
climate change to the complex Phanerozoic climate-CO2 relationship is to simply say that
precisely because of the massive changes in the earth and its system over such a long
time period, the Phanerozoic record really is not very relevant to predicting the future
impacts of present day CO2forcings. On the CO2 primary view, sedimentary data that
show a close relationship between warming sea surface temperatures and increasing CO2
around the time of the end of the last ice age136 support the theory that it was the increase
in CO2 itself that caused the warming and deglaciation.137 However, because of
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uncertainty in dating the CO2 records (both from sedimentary and ice core records), this
data did not permit scientists to isolate the exact timing of CO2 changes versus
temperature changes.138 A recent study addresses part of this problem by sampling
sediment core data at a very fine, centimeter level scale that accumulated at a location
where sediments contain evidence on the temperature of both western tropical Pacific
surface water and deep Pacific water the time of the last glacial transition (the end of the
last ice age). This method allowed the researchers to overcome the shortcoming in
previous research that there was no way to date temperature and CO2 changes.139
By independently measuring data on southern ocean (that is, Antarctic) temperature
and tropical sea surface temperature, Stott et. Al. found that:
“nearly all of the warming in glacial/interglacial deep-water warming occurred
before 17,500 years ago, and therefore before both the onset of deglacial warming
in tropical Pacific surface waters and the increase in CO2 concentrations…together
that the onset of deglacial warming throughout the Southern Hemisphere occurred
long before deglacial warming began in the tropical surface ocean…[and this
means] that the mechanism responsible for initiating the deglacial events does not
lie directly within the tropics itself, nor can these events be explained by CO2
forcing alone. Both CO2 and the tropical SST’s did not begin to change until well
after 18 kyB.P., approximately 1000 years after the benthic 18O record indicates
that the Southern Ocean was warming.”140
Stott et. al. “suggest that the trigger for the initial deglacial warming around Antarctica
was the change in solar insolation over the Southern Ocean during the austral spring that
influenced the retreat of the sea ice,” that in turn led to decreased stratification of the
Southern Ocean, promoting “enhanced ventilation of the deep sea and the subsequent rise
in atmospheric CO2.”141 In other words, their best guess is that an increase in CO2 did
not cause warming in the period of deglaciation that they studied, but rather that an
increase in the energy from the sun that caused the warming that eventually led to an
increase in CO2.
The 2007 paper by Stott et al. does not appear to be an outlier. Roughly
contemporaneous work by Ahn and Brook142 constructed temperature and CO2 records
covering both episodes of abrupt warming followed by cooling (Dansgaard-Oeschger
events) and long separating cold periods (Heinrich events) that occurred during the last
glacial. Ahn and Brook found a correlation between increases in CO2 and warming
periods, but also found that unlike the large increases in methane that are known to have
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immediately preceded temperature increases, “CO2 does not lead temperature, [and] CO2
variations were not a direct trigger for the climate changes that occurred during the last
glacial period.” Oddly, although the IPCC’s 2007 AR cites many articles that were
published as late as 2007, neither the paper by Sott et al. nor that by Ahn and Brook are
mentioned in the chapter on paleo-climatology in the 2007 AR.
More recent work by Saikku et al.143 confirms a similar pattern for Antarctica, in
which atmospheric and deep water temperatures “begin warming and reach peak values
in advance of rising CO2.” Like Ahn and Brook, Saikku et al. hypothesize that changes
in wind strength and sea ice extent in the southern ocean may have accounted for the
increased release of CO2 from the oceans to the atmosphere. Other recent work covering
the current interglacial period suggests that changes in the earth’s orbit, and hence solar
energy strength in Antarctica, as the original driving force behind changes in CO2 and
temperature.144
2. What Happens to the Water? Recent Findings that Atmospheric Water Vapor
and Precipitation are not Responding to a Warming Atmosphere in the Way that
Climate Models Predict
A second example of the climate establishment’s rhetorical strategy of simply
ignoring disconfirming evidence is provided by the treatment of studies tending to
disconfirm conceptually and numerically central predictions of climate models: that
atmospheric water vapor will increase with rising atmospheric temperatures, but global
precipitation will increase only relatively modestly with warming.
To understand the importance of climate model projections about water vapor and
precipitation requires reviewing a bit about water in the atmosphere. It is important first
to clarify the different ways to measure the water content of a given parcel of air. The
vapor pressure measures the water content using the partial pressure of the water vapor in
the air (the pressure of the water vapor as opposed to the other molecular constituents of
an air parcel). An alternative measure, specific humidity, measures the mass of water
vapor for a given mass of air (typically expressed as grams of water vapor per kilograms
of air). However, the maximum amount of water vapor that a given parcel of air can hold
– its saturation water vapor pressure – increases with temperature. A way to measure the
amount of water vapor in the air that normalizes for air temperature is relative humidity –
defined as the ratio of the amount of water vapor in air of a given temperature to the
saturation amount of water vapor in the air at that temperature.
Water vapor in the atmosphere comes from the evaporation of water from earth’s
surface, especially the oceans.145 When air is at its saturation point for a given
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temperature, any cooling of the air will result in condensation of water (in other words,
condensation occurs when the water vapor equilibrium is exceeded). When water
condenses in the atmosphere, it produces clouds and precipitation. Dynamically, because
the density (mass/volume) of water vapor is considerably less than that of dry air, moist
air masses tend to rise and cool, reaching a point where they are over-saturated, causing
clouds and precipitation to form, drying the air masses, which then fall. The net result of
this process is that the latent heat of vaporization is released to the atmosphere.
In climate models, global warming means two things: an increase in surface
temperature, and an increase in the temperature of the lower levels of the atmosphere.
Now because air holds more water, the higher is the temperature of the air (the saturation
vapor pressure increases with temperature), by increasing the temperature of the
atmosphere, global warming is predicted to lead to an increase in the amount of water
vapor in the atmosphere. The increase in water vapor pressure as a function of
temperature increase is in fact precisely predicted by a fundamental relationship in
thermodynamics known as the Clausius-Clapeyron equation.146 This equation predicts an
approximately exponential increase in specific humidity (mass of water vapor per mass of
air) as temperature increases as well as a (smaller) increase in relative humidity (ratio of
the amount of water vapor in the air compared to the amount required for saturation at a
particular temperature). Other things equal, the increase in humidity should lead to an
increase in precipitation. At the same time, one might well expect an even bigger
increase in precipitation, because warmer surface temperatures might well mean more
evaporation, especially from the oceans and hence even more water vapor being put into
a warmer atmosphere.
Quite surprisingly, this is not what climate change models predict. The current set
of coupled ocean-atmosphere GCM’s predict substantial increases in atmospheric water
vapor (in the range of 7% per degree centigrade) as a consequence of CO2 forced
temperature increases.147 Direct application of the Clausius-Clapyeron relation would
imply that such an increase in atmospheric water vapor would lead to a predicted increase
in precipitation of roughly the same magnitude, around 6-7% per degree centigrade.148
However, the climate models predict substantially smaller increases in precipitation, in
the range of only a 1-3.5%.149 The discrepancy between increases in precipitation
predicted by climate models and what one would predict based on fundamental
thermodynamic relations is in fact even greater than this because, as noted above, other
things equal, evaporation should increase as the surface temperature warms. For
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example, a 1 degree centigrade increase in global surface air temperature should cause a
5.7% increase in evaporation (denoted by E).150
Climate models do not in fact predict such big increases in evaporation, and it is
apparently in large part due to the relatively modest increases in evaporation that such
models predict that the models also generate relatively small predicted increases in
precipitation. As the models predict that air-sea temperature differentials and relative
humidity will remain relatively constant, the only variable that can change to lower the
predicted increase in evaporation (and hence precipitation, under the long-term constraint
that precipitation, P, equals evaporation, E, in the global, closed system) is the surface
wind stress. That is, to get the “muted response of precipitation to global warming”
predicted by GCM’s “requires a decrease in global winds”151 brought about by changing
global atmospheric circulation patterns.
It is not possible to measure evaporation over large areas,152 and water vapor, wind,
and precipitation are not measured over the entire closed global system. However, in
recent years, climate scientists have begun to collect data on atmospheric water vapor,
wind and precipitation over large regions. And what they are finding is that at least on
regional scales, water vapor, wind and precipitation are not moving in the direction
predicted by GCM climate models.
Using satellite observations of precipitation, total water vapor and surface wind
stress over the oceans, supplemented by a blend of satellite and rain gauge measurements
over land areas, over the period 1987 to 2006 (during which time the Earth’s surface
temperature warmed by about .19 degrees C per decade), Wentz et. al. evaluated these
various GCM predictions. Using the satellite dataset, they found that over their study
period, winds over the 30 degree north to 30 degree south tropics increased by .04 meters
per second per decade and over all oceans at a rate of .08 meters per second per decade.
These observations were “opposite to the GCM results, which predict that the 1987 to
2006 warming should have been accompanied by a decrease in winds on the order of
magnitude of ….8% per decade.”153 When Wentz et. al. looked at the variability of
precipitation and evaporation over their study period, they found a “pronounced
difference between the precipitation time series from the climate models and that from
the satellite observations.” Climate models under-predicted both the amplitude of
interannual variability, decadal trends and the response to El Ninos by a factor of 2 to 3.
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Even more important, the observed values of evaporation, E, precipitation, P and wind,
W, all exhibited similar responses to the two El Ninos, similar magnitudes of interannual
variability, and similar decadal trends, suggesting an “acceleration in the hydrologic
cycle of about 6% [per degree centigrade], close to the value” derived from the basic
Clausius-Clapeyron relationship. However, there was “no evidence in the observations
that radiative forcing in the troposphere is inhibiting the variations in E, P, and W.
Rather, E and P seem to simply vary in unison with the total atmospheric water
content.”154
Wentz et. al.’s conclusion is striking, for it certainly does not increase one’s
confidence in the current generation of GCM models. As they present their summary
interpretation, the most likely explanation for the discrepancy between observations and
GCM predictions is that:
“the climate models have in common a compensating error in characterizing the
radiative balance for the troposphere and the Earth’s surface. For example,
variations in modeling cloud radiative forcing at the surface can have a relatively
large effect on the precipitation response, whereas the temperature response is more
driven by how clouds affect the radiation at the top of the atmosphere. …The
difference between a subdued increase in rainfall and a C-C [Clausius-Clapeyron]
increase has enormous impact, with respect to the consequences of global warming.
Can the total water in the atmosphere increase by 15% with CO2 doubling but
precipitation increase by only 4%? Will warming really bring a decrease in global
winds? The observations here suggest otherwise…”155
The study by Wentz, et al is by no means the only recent empirical work to cast
doubt on climate model predictions of water vapor and precipitation. Utilizing monthly
data on water vapor and lower tropospheric temperature from the North American
Regional Reanalysis over the period 1979 to 2006, Wang et al. found that while
atmospheric temperature significantly increased at a rate of about .08 degrees centigrade
per decade, neither of the measures of water vapor content that they used showed any
significant increase.156 While the authors are careful to note that their study was mostly
over land and an open (regional) system – versus the closed global land/ocean system –
as they clearly state, the North American water vapor trends that they found are
“inconsistent with the trends projected by a rising temperature if a constant relative
humidity is assumed,” as climate models do.157
More recently still, Paltridge et al. have looked at absolute and relative humidity
tends over the period 1973-2007 at different altitudes and in both tropical and midlatitude zones and found little support for the constant relative humidity feature that is
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crucial to the large water vapor feedback effect in climate models.158 More precisely,
climate models predict that even with surface and tropospheric warming, relative
humidity at any given height in the troposphere remains roughly constant. Paltridge et al.
find by contrast that for all the latitude zones that they studied, for all altitudes above the
convective boundary layer, relative humidity “decreased over the past three or four
decades as the surface and atmospheric temperatures have increased.”159
To be sure, the Paltridge study was published after the IPCC’s 2007 Assessment
Report. However, the general strategy of the IPCC’s most recent report was to stress
conflicting, satellite data tending to show roughly constant relative humidity, in line with
climate model implications, and to emphasize the problems with the atmospheric
humidity measurements relied upon by Paltridge et al.160 Since the publication of the
2007 IPCC AR, a similar strategy has continued to be taken by the scientists who were
influential in shaping the discussion of water vapor feedback in that Report. In a 2009
review essay, Dessler and Sherwood161 argue that recent observations of a strong positive
water vapor feedback from short term climate perturbations162 show that “the water vapor
feedback is virtually certain to be strongly positive, with most evidence supporting a
magnitude sufficient to roughly double the warming that would otherwise occur.” Dessler
dismisses work such as that by Wang et al.163 as focusing only on regional, as opposed to
global measurements of humidity, and dismisses the study by Paltridge et al. because its
central findings are not achieved when one uses newer, “more modern and sophisticated
reanalysis data sets.”164 On the view maintained by Dessler and Sherwood and the IPCC,
to generate “virtually certain” predictions of the large positive water vapor feedback that
will result from an increase CO2, one doesn’t need to have an accurate model of how
clouds and rainfall (involving “detailed microphysics and other small-scale processes”)
will change with such an increase in water vapor. Instead, a “surprisingly” simple model
accurately predicts the water vapor feedback: an increase in atmospheric CO2 increases
tropical surface temperatures, leading to increased water vapor in the tropical region,
where most of the water vapor is transported by convection far above the cloud layer into
the upper troposphere (because the difference in temperature between the surface and
158
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troposphere is so great in the tropics), where the large scale global circulation transports
the (increased) water vapor across the global troposphere.165
3. Climate Feedbacks: Are Clouds and Rain Really Irrelevant?
Even if Dessler and Sherwood are correct that the crucial water vapor feedback
effect can be estimated without the necessity of having an accurate model of how a
warmer, and wetter, atmosphere will affect cloud formation and other climatic
“microprocesses,” cloud and rainfall changes are still among the primary feedback effects
that determine the sensitivity of climate models. On clouds, as with water vapor, there is
evidence in the peer reviewed literature that cloud changes observed during the late
twentieth century are not consistent with what climate models are generally presuming.
In this section, I briefly compare what the IPCC Report has to say about what is currently
known regarding the crucial cloud feedback effect with what one can find in the peeredited journal literature.166 This comparison shows that on cloud feedbacks, the IPCC is
relatively candid regarding the existence of scientific uncertainty. But while the literature
strongly suggests that uncertainty regarding cloud feedbacks is so fundamental that it
virtually eliminates any ability to generate reliable quantitative predictions about the
impact of elevated CO2 on climate, the IPCC’s most recent Fourth Assessment Report
takes great pains to do exactly the opposite by adopting rhetoric that minimizes and
downplays the significance of uncertainty over cloud feedbacks.
a) The IPCC on Cloud Feedback
The IPCC report explains in a succinct (if rather vague) way the two
counteracting effects of cloud on surface temperature:
“By reflecting solar radiation back to space (the albedo effect of clouds) and by
trapping infrared radiation emitted by the surface and the lower troposphere (the
greenhouse effect of clouds), clouds exert two competing effects on the Earth’s
radiation budget. These two effects are usually referred to as the SW and LW
components of the cloud radiative forcing (CRF)….In the current climate, clouds
exert a cooling effect on climate (the global mean CRF is negative). 167
The IPCC Report then admits quite quickly that clouds are quantitatively very
significant in determining the earth’s radiative fluxes (or flows) and there is great
uncertainty over how the balance between cloud cooling and cloud warming might be
impacted by CO2- induced global warming:
“At the time of the TAR [the Third Assessment Report, issued in 2001], clouds
remained a major source of uncertainty in the simulation of climate changes (as
they still are at present: e.g. [various sections cited])…
165
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“…the amplitude and even the sign of cloud feedbacks as noted in the TAR as
highly uncertain, and this uncertainty was cited as one of the key factors
explaining the spread in model simulations of future climate for a given emission
scenario. This cannot be regarded as a surprise…Clouds, which cover about 60%
of the earth’s surface, are responsible for up to two-thirds of the planetary albedo,
which is about 30%. An albedo decrease of only 1%, bringing the Earth’s albedo
from 30% to 29%, would cause an increase in the black-body radiative
equilibrium temperature of about 1 degree C, a highly significant value, roughly
equivalent to the direct radiative effect of a doubling of the atmospheric CO2
concentration…The strong effect of cloud processes on climate model
sensitivities to greenhouse gases was emphasized through a now classic set of
General Circulation Model (GCM) experiments, carried out by Senior and
Mitchell (1993). They produced global average surface temperature changes (due
to doubled atmospheric CO2 concentration) ranging from 1.9 degrees C to 5.4
degrees C, simply by altering the way that cloud radiative properties were treated
in the model.”168
To its credit, the IPCC Report admits that different assumptions regarding cloud
feedbacks largely account for the differences across models in predicted climate
sensitivities, in that without cloud feedbacks, current GCM’s would predict a climate
sensitivity (+/- 1 standard deviation) of roughly 1.9 degrees C +/- .15 degree C, whereas
with cloud feedbacks, the actual mean and standard deviation of climate sensitivity
estimates from current GCM’s are “several times this”, 3.2 degrees C +/- .7 degree C.169
The IPCC Report admirably both discloses how uncertainty over cloud feedback effects
is largely responsible for the spread in predictions across different climate models, and
explains where that uncertainty is coming from:
“…the spread of climate sensitivity estimates among current models arises
primarily from inter-model differences in cloud feedbacks…cloud feedbacks
remain the largest source of uncertainty in climate sensitivity estimates…170
“inter-model differences in cloud feedbacks are mostly attributable to the SW
[short wave] cloud feedback component, and that the responses to global warming
of both deep convective clouds and low-level clouds differ among GCM’s.
Recent analyses suggest that the response of boundary-layer clouds constitutes the
largest contributor to the range of climate change feedbacks among current
GCM’s. It is due both to large discrepancies in the radiative response simulated
by models in regions dominated by low level cloud cover…and to the large areas
of the globe covered by these regions….However, …the spread of model cloud
feedbacks is substantial at all latitudes, and tends to be larger in the tropics.” 171
While the IPCC Report is admirably candid in acknowledging uncertainty about
cloud feedbacks, it fails to acknowledge, and indeed even conceals, the enormous gap
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between the scientific literature on cloud feedbacks and the assumptions about cloud
feedbacks in the GCM models it relies upon for climate change predictions. The Report
notes that “the GCM’s all predict a positive cloud feedback but strongly disagree on its
magnitude.”172A little later, the Report discusses, as if it were an unrelated topic, recent
debate over 1) (climate scientist Richard Lindzen’s) conjecture that the tropical area
covered by high topped anvil clouds might decrease with rising temperature, leading to a
negative climate feedback; 2) conjectures that low level, cooling boundary layer clouds
over the ocean might increase, leading to cooling; and, 3) the hypothesis that an increase
in extratropical storm strength would dominate decreases in storm frequency, producing
increased reflection of SW radiation and decreased emission of LW radiation, where this
final debate has been prompted by studies (discussed below) reporting observed
decreases in cloud thickness.173 The IPCC Report does declare that new observational
data has “revealed systematic biases in the current version of GCM’s, such as the
tendency to over-predict optically thick clouds,” and that these “errors… cast doubts on
the reliability of the model cloud feedbacks. …under-prediction of low and mid-level
clouds presumably effects the magnitude of the radiative response to climate warming in
the widespread regions of subsidence.”174
Were one approaching the climate change prediction problem for the first time,
one might well conclude from the IPCC AR4’s own discussion that the GCM’s are
probably wrong in assuming a positive cloud feedback, and that their projected
temperature increases are consequently biased upward. Yet the Report’s discussion of
clouds concludes by saying only that “…it is not yet possible to assess which of the
model estimates of cloud feedback is the most reliable. However, progress has been
made in the identification of the cloud types, the dynamical regimes and the regions of
the globe responsible for the large spread of cloud feedback estimates among current
models.”175
b) The Peer-Reviewed Scientific Literature on Cloud Feedback
For quite some time, climate scientists have understood the basic mechanisms by
which clouds affect climate. On the vertical dimension, high, cold cirrus clouds capture
and reflect back longwave radiation, thus heating the earth’s surface and the atmosphere,
an effect especially prominent at low latitudes, while low, warmer clouds reflect solar
shortwave radiation, thus cooling the earth’s surface and atmosphere, an effect that is
especially likely at higher latitudes.176 Thus by tending to warm the tropical atmosphere
and warm the polar atmosphere, “…clouds enhance the latitudinal gradient of column
cooling and reinforce the meridional heating gradients responsible for forcing the mean
meridional circulation of the atmosphere.”177
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The literature explains the reason why the cloud feedback effect is so hard to fully
understand and, thus far, impossible to predict: the relationship between clouds and the
earth’s climate system runs in both directions; clouds impact the earth’s radiation budget,
but are themselves dependent upon climate. Almost two decades ago, climate scientist
Albert Arking noted that while the first relationship, the “radiative impact of clouds on
climate is at least understood in principle…the dependence of cloud cover on the
variables of the climate system is only understood in isolated areas under rather limited
conditions.”178 Crucially, and as the IPCC rightly points out in its 2007 AR, the variation
among climate models’ sensitivity – the temperature increase predicted to result from a
CO2 doubling—is “widely believed to be due to uncertainties in cloud feedbacks.”179
Relatively small temperature increases are predicted by models that predict increased
low-level cloudiness, while big temperature increases are predicted by models that
predict decreased low level cloudiness.180
According to a very widely cited and seemingly authoritative assessment of the
state of our knowledge about cloud feedbacks by climate scientist Graeme Stephens,
advancing our understanding of cloud feedback effects depends upon recognizing that
“[i]t is the atmospheric circulation that broadly determines where and when clouds form
and how they evolve. Cloud influences, in turn, feed back on the atmospheric circulation
through their effects on surface and atmospheric heating, …Therefore the basis for
understanding this important feedback, in part, lies in developing a clearer understanding
of the association between atmospheric circulation regimes and the cloudiness that
characterizes these ‘weather’ regimes.”181 In his view, climate models must be evaluated
by their ability to “reproduce the observed present-day distribution of clouds, their effects
on the earth’s energy budgets, and their relation to other processes, as well as to be able
to reproduce observed climate variability.”182 Importantly, as Stephens explains, existing
tests that compare modeled versus observed cloud cover and/or top of the atmosphere
(TOA) cloud radiative forcing are inadequate, because:
“merely reproducing distributions of observed parameters independent of one
another is not an adequate test of models since it is possible to tune to the
observations using any one of many combinations of cloud parameters that,
individually, might be unrealistic…Simple comparisons of model and observed
cloud parameters does not provide any insight into the realism of those processes
essential to feedback. “183
As an example of this problem, Stephens discusses how one widely used climate model
(the ECMWF – European Center for medium-range weather forecasts) predicts lower
amounts of high clouds but thicker boundary layer clouds than observed, and yet has a
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total cloud shortwave flux that is close to the observed value (although its longwave
cloud flux is not close to the observed value). 184
In summarizing our present understanding of cloud feedbacks and, in particular,
cloud feedbacks in the GCM climate models, Stephens offers the following remarks:
“GCM climate and NWP models represent the most complete description of all
the interactions between the processes that establish the main cloud
feedbacks, [but] the weak link in the use of these models lies in the cloud
parameterization embedded in them. Aspects of these parameterizations remain
worrisome containing levels of empiricism and assumptions that are hard to
evaluate with current global observations.
“…[o]ut of necessity, most studies make ad hoc assumptions about the overriding
importance of one process over all others generally ignoring other key processes,
and notably the influence of atmospheric dynamics on cloudiness. Generally little
discussion is offered as to what the system is let alone justification for the
assumptions given…Most analysis of feedback concentrates on the global-mean
climate system and global-mean surface temperature defining cloud feedbacks as
those processes that connect changes in cloud properties to changes in globalmean temperature. There is, however, no theoretical basis to define feedbacks
this way nor any compelling empirical evidence to do so….Comparisons of
feedback diagnostics applied to the same GCM but derived using different
analysis methods with different assumptions about the nature of the
system…produce estimates of feedbacks that not only vary in strength but also in
sign. Thus we are led to conclude that the diagnostic tools currently in use by
the climate community to study feedback, at least as implemented, are
problematic and immature and generally cannot be verified using
observations.”185
Notably, Stephens’s article explaining the seemingly important limitations on
scientific knowledge about cloud feedback effects is never even cited in the IPCC’s 2007
AR4. This failure to mention and discuss such a widely cited article, and one that
appeared some years before the 2007 AR, seems to indicate that the 2007 AR was not a
full and complete assessment.
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c) Cloud Feedback: The Evidence for Natural Cooling that Offsets the CO2
Greenhouse Effect
Recently, climate scientists have taken Stephens’ advice—that the “blueprint for
progress must follow a more arduous path that requires carefully orchestrated and
systematic combination of model and observations”186—and have attempted to combine
theoretical predictions with observations not at the large scale of months, years or
decades, but at the level of daily observations of clouds, radiation, temperature and other
variables that can then be compared with GCM predictions.
Studying six years of daily data on tropical (20 degrees north to 20 degress south)
oceanic averages during fifteen tropical intraseasonal oscillations, Spencer et. al.187 found
a negative feedback, with “enhanced radiative cooling of the ocean-atmosphere system
during the tropospheric warm phase of the oscillation.” Spencer et. al. traced this
“unexpected” transition from net cloud warming to net cloud cooling during the
oscillation’s rainy, tropospheric warming phase to a decrease in ice cloud coverage.188
Spencer et. al. repeatedly caution that the time scales they studied were much shorter than
climate change time scales. Yet they also observed that as “all moist convective
adjustment occurs on short time scales,” and “intraseasonal oscillations represent a
dominant model of convective variability in the tropical troposphere, their behavior
should be considered when testing the convective and cloud parameterizations in climate
models that are used to predict global warming.”
Another study in a similar spirit begins by observing that:
“Low-level clouds combine a small greenhouse effect with a generally high
albedo and thus contribute significantly to the overall net cooling role of clouds in
earth’s climate. Currently, lack of both resolution and appropriate physical
parameterizations prohibit reliable large-scale prediction of cloud-climate
feedbacks…A good strategy for improving our understanding of climate
mechanisms and their numerical simulation is to carry out focused studies that
elucidate specific ocean-atmosphere-cloud relationships and that can inform and
constrain model results. By examining the interannual variability of low-level
clouds in the eastern equatorial Pacific, an area of high atmospheric and oceanic
variability located on the edge of a persistent stratiform cloud deck, we aim to
uncover sometimes-subtle details of marine low-level cloud processes…”189
This study, by Mansbach and Norris, found that especially in the region extending 1500
km west of the Galapagos Islands, interannual low level cloud variability was explained
neither by variation in sea surface temperatures nor in lower troposphere static stability,
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but rather primarily by SST advection and atmospheric surface stability (with warm SST
[sea surface temperature] advection stabilizing the atmospheric surface layer, inhibiting
upward mixing of moisture from the sea surface and resulting in a decrease in cloud
amount and more frequent absence of low level clouds).190 Mansbach and Norris explain
that “although beyond the scope of the present study to quantify, we note that the
observed inverse relationships between SST and SST advection and between cloud and
SST advection imply the existence of a negative cloud feedback on and about the nearequatorial SST front.”191 Notably, climate models do not accurately simulate the SST
advection – cloud relationships found by Mansbach and Norris: for varying reasons, both
the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory GCM and the National Center for
Atmospheric Research coupled OAGCM’s are inaccurate.
d) Clouds and The Relationship between Weather and Climate
A look at the literature thus reveals that the IPCC has just hinted at the scientific
controversy over cloud feedback effects, and at just how much the climate predictions it
advances rely upon what are basically just guesses about whether cloud feedback is likely
to be positive or negative, and big or small. But clouds are actually even more central to
the climate change debate than this. Just how central can be grasped by looking at the
views of climate scientist Roy Spencer.192
Spencer takes issue with a basic assumption maintained by most climate modelers
and researchers, which is that “an increase in the greenhouse effect from manmade
greenhouse gases causes a warming effect that is similar to that from an increase in
sunlight.” The difference, in Spencer’s view, is that the natural greenhouse effect (which
comes mostly from water vapor and clouds), “is under the control of weather systems –
especially precipitation systems – which are generated in response to solar heating.
Either directly or indirectly, those precipitation systems determine the moisture (water
vapor and cloud) characteristics for most of the rest of the atmosphere.” Basically (and
colloquially), the more efficient is the precipitation system’s response to rising
atmospheric temperature (and hence water vapor), the more water vapor is recycled back
to the surface as rainfall and the less water vapor remains in the atmosphere. Since water
vapor is by far the most important greenhouse gas, the more efficient are precipitation
systems at removing water vapor, the lower the equilibrium temperature increase from
any radiative forcing (such as an increase in a different greenhouse gas, such as CO2). In
the words of climate scientists, “the climate equilibrium depends crucially on cloud
microphysical processes. Clouds with high precipitation efficiency produce cold and dry
climates. This happens because most of the cloud condensed water falls out as rain,
leaving little available to moisten the atmosphere.”193 The great defect in GCM climate
studies can now be understood:
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“Since climate equilibrium can be very sensitive to the cloud microphysical
processes, any cumulus convection scheme adequate for use in GCM’s should be
strongly based on them. Considering that the cumulus convection schemes
currently in use in GCM’s are based on somewhat arbitrary moistening
assumptions, they are probably inadequate for climate change studies.”194
In slightly less technical language, the huge problem with GCM climate models is
that these models do not actually model the physical processes that produce precipitation
systems, but instead set various parameters at values such that the models accurately
reproduce spatial and temporal patterns in average precipitation. These models cannot
shed any light at all on how the efficiency of precipitation systems might change due to a
forced atmospheric warming.195 While it is still a minority view, there is now evidence
published in peer-edited scientific journals – the studies discussed above—that supports
the view of Spencer and other climate scientists that precipitation systems act in effect as
a kind of atmospheric thermostat and would cause the atmosphere to cool in response to a
temperature increase due to CO2 increases.
4. Direct Evidence on Feedback Effects
The difficulty of measuring changes in atmospheric water in response to warming
surface and tropospheric temperatures should not be taken to indicate that more direct
measurements of feedback effects are not possible. Since the mid-1980’s, radiative flux
measurements have been taken by radiometers placed in satellites as part of the Earth
Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE). Although there are limitations in the data,
Lindzen and Choi of MIT recently reported ERBE radiometer measurements for sea
surface temperature (SST), outgoing longwave radiation and reflected shortwave (solar)
radiation in the tropical region (20 degrees south to 20 degrees north) for the period
1985-1999.196 Even taking account of the known uncertainty in the ERBE data, Lindzen
and Choi find that the ERBE show a net negative feedback as SST rose during their study
period, primarily due to increased reflection of solar radiation (as discussed in more detail
below, this would occur if there were an increase in high level clouds due to CO2-forced
warming). Given this negative feedback, the implied temperature increase from a
doubling of CO2 – which as discussed earlier is referred to as climate sensitivity – is,
according to Lindzen and Choi, about .5 degrees Celsius. Given that climate models
generate a sensitivity of between 1.5 and 5 degrees Celsius, the ERBE data would seem
to indicate that the climate models used by the IPCC vastly overstate climate sensitivity.
The reason they do so, as explained earlier, is because they assume large positive
feedbacks. The results reported by Lindzen and Choi would seem to suggest that the
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fundamental assumption in climate models used by the IPCC – of large positive
feedbacks – indeed the assumption that by itself is responsible for potentially catastrophic
large temperature increases – is strongly disconfirmed by the existing evidence.
D. Compared to What? The Failure to Rigorously Test the CO2 Primacy Hypothesis
Against Alternative Explanations for Late Twentieth Century
What is called “detection and attribution” by the IPCC is actually the crucial
scientific question of whether increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, as
opposed to something else, can be rigorously and confidently identified as responsible for
the warming trend that began in the early twentieth century and accelerated in its latter
decades. Notably, in the “Summary for Policymakers” to the 2007 physical science
Assessment Report, the IPCC does not even mention the topic of detection and
attribution. To repeat, in the summary released to the media well in advance of the full
Report, the IPCC did not find it worthwhile to state its conclusion that increases in human
greenhouse gases (ghg’s), versus other potential causes, were responsible for recent
temperature increases.
The summary explanation of how the IPCC identified increased human ghg
emissions as the culprit appeared first in the “Technical Summary” that accompanied the
full Report. Here, the IPCC said that it had concluded that it is “extremely unlikely” that
warming over the past 50 years “can be explained without external forcing,” because:
“these changes took place over a time period when non-anthropogenic forcing
factors (i.e. the sun and volcanic forcing) would be likely to have produced cooling,
not warming…it is very likely that these natural forcings alone cannot account for
the observed warming. There is also increased confidence that natural internal
variability cannot account for the observed changes, due in part to improved studies
that warming occurred in both oceans and atmosphere, together with observed ice
mass losses.”197
Remarkably, on the very same page, the IPCC wrote that:
“…uncertainties remain in estimates of natural internal variability…internal
variability is difficult to estimate from available observational records since these
are influenced by external forcing, and because records are not long enough in the
case of instrumental data, or precise enough in the case of proxy reconstructions, to
provide complete descriptions of variability on decadal and longer time scales.”198
By “natural variability” the IPCC was referring to the fact that because the climate
system is chaotic (that is, highly non-linear), it will exhibit cycles and swings that are
entirely internal to the climate system, caused quite literally by nothing that is new or
outside the system itself.
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What is remarkable about the two passages just quoted is that the IPCC is nakedly
applying dramatically different standards of proof to the two competing alternative
hypotheses that recent warming is due to elevated atmospheric levels of CO2versus
natural or internal variability. Even the partial survey of the literature that follows
immediately below seems to suggest that the observed changes in global average surface
temperature are quite possibly due to internal variability. It would seem that the short
observational record and inaccuracy in proxy reconstructions affect the ability to test to
the CO2 primacy hypothesis no more and no less than they effect the ability to test the
internal variability hypothesis. If this is not the case, then one would certainly like to see
an explanation of why, for the ultimate question is one of identifying CO2 as the culprit.
That forces other than increases in atmospheric CO2 may have contributed to the
observed late 20th century warming of global surface temperatures is strongly suggested
by recent improved data on temperature trends in the troposphere. This is clearly
explained in a recent non-technical article by climate scientist Richard Lindzen.199
Lindzen begins200 by noting that precisely because water vapor is such a strong
greenhouse gas, the idea that the surface of the earth cools primarily by thermal radiation
is highly misleading. Surface heat escapes through the action of the fluid motions of
convection and planetary scale circulation patterns. These motions move heat upward
and poleward to a level of the atmosphere – called the characteristic emission level –
where it can escape to space. Increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases raise the
characteristic emission level. At this colder level of the atmosphere, the outgoing
longwave radiation no longer balances the net incoming solar radiation. For equilibrium
to be restored, the temperature at the characteristic emission level must increase. This,
precisely speaking, is what is called radiative forcing in the climate science literature. As
Lindzen explains, how warming at the characteristic emission level relates to surface
warming is “not altogether clear,” but regardless of the particular climate model, the
signature or “fingerprint” of greenhouse warming is that the “greenhouse contribution to
warming at the surface should be between less than half and one third of the warming
seen in the upper troposphere,” with an upper bound of about 1/2.5.201 Recent
observations depict a warming trend in the troposphere of about .1 degree centigrade per
decade, which if due to greenhouse warming should have been associated with a surface
trend of .04 degrees centigrade per decade or about .4 degrees centigrade over the 20th
century. Surface data, however, show a warming of about .13 degrees centigrade over
the latter part of the 20th century. This implies that only about 1/3 of the observed
surface warming is due to greenhouse gases.
Given this basic analytical starting point, the question, as Lindzen succinctly puts
it, is “How then did the IPCC Summary for Policymakers reach its conclusion that most
of the surface warming over the past 30 years is due to anthropogenic forcing?”202 The

199

Richard S. Lindzen, Taking Greenhouse Warming Seriously, 18 Energy & Env. 937 (2007).
The following discussion is taken from Lindzen, Taking Greenhouse Warming Seriously, 18 Energy &
Env. 937, 940-944.
201
Lindzen, Taking Greenhouse Warming Seriously, 18 Energy & Env. 937, 942.
202
Lindzen, Taking Greenhouse Warming Seriously, 18 Energy & Env. 937, 944.
200

48

literature reviewed seems to raise more questions than to answer Lindzen’s question, thus
tending to weaken rather than strengthen confidence in the IPCC’s conclusion.
1. Atmospheric Circulation and Climate Change Detection, Attribution and
Regional Climate Change Predictions
The detection and attribution of anthropogenic forcing (greenhouse gas emissions)
as the global warming culprit is based on comparing spatio-temporal temperature
observations – rather than just a temperature time series -- with modeled patterns.203 Yet
recent work suggests that just as they manage to reproduce past temperature time series
despite failing to agree at all on climate sensitivity, so too do the ensemble of models
used by the IPCC manage to reproduce the spatio-temporal pattern of global temperature
despite fundamental disagreement over how global warming will alter global atmospheric
circulation patterns.
The general circulation of the earth’s atmosphere is driven by two primary forces:
the heating of the low latitudes relative to higher latitudes, and the rotation of the earth on
its axis.204 The relative heating of the tropics accounts for the Hadley circulation, a
simple equator-to-pole circulation in which warm air rises in the tropics and flows toward
the poles at relatively high altitudes, and is replaced (as the law of the conservation of
mass requires) by cooler air flowing down from the polar regions at lower altitudes,
where warmer air correspondingly descends. The Hadley circulation cannot itself explain
global atmospheric circulation, because it ignores the earth’s rotation, and is insufficient
(standing alone) to generate an equilibrium wind speed and explain west to east (or east
to west) winds. To get a basic approximation of atmospheric movement, one needs to
take account of the acceleration due to the earth’s spinning about on its axis. This
account is provided by the (somewhat misnamed) Coriolis Force, the name given to the
acceleration of air parcels due to the earth’s rotation. Given the direction of the earth’s
rotation, and the Hadley cell movement of warm air out from the equator and toward the
poles, the Coriolos force bends air parcels to the east (rightward relative to the direction
of parcel motion in the northern hemisphere, leftward in the southern) in both
hemispheres. Because of the Coriolos force, major global winds move from the west to
the east (and because of the basic pressure gradient) along lines of constant pressure.
The earth’s rotation is in fact sufficiently strong that the Coriolis force is so strong
that a single equator to pole circulation cell – a single Hadley cell – is unstable. The
direct meridional circulation named after Hadley extends only to about 30 degrees
latitude in each hemisphere. Instead, in each hemisphere, the Hadley cell breaks apart, as
it were, into three cells: moving poleward, a tropical Hadley cell, a Ferrell cell, and,
finally, a polar cell, each of which replicates the basic circular poleward flow of warm air
toward cold.205 The latter two are caused by large scale eddy fluxes – cyclones and anti203
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cyclones.206 At least half of the total poleward heat transport in the atmosphere is
accomplished by such eddies -- mid-latitude storm systems and waves and other kinds of
turbulence.207 The processes are complex and chaotic, and it seems that the particular
equator to pole temperature gradient that results from their interaction is that which
maximizes the entropy (or disorder) of the climate system.208 In any event, in the
extratropics, the transport of mass, energy and momentum in the atmosphere are driven
by these fundamentally turbulent eddies, rather than by the relatively simple Hadley
circulation that is the dominant poleward force in the tropics.209
In explaining regional climate, the large scale circulation patterns are crucial. As a
consequence of the Hadley circulation, the surface pressure at 30 degrees latitude (where
air is subsiding) is generally greater than at the equator (where air is rising), and the
tropical surface tradewinds blow generally toward the equator from both hemispheres,
meeting in the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) where there is low surface
pressure and large scale upward motion with latent heat release.210 In both hemispheres,
the ITCZ moves with the seasons: the large area of convection centered over Indonesia
moves southward, extending as far south as 30 degrees south, during the southern
hemisphere summer; in the Amazon, the heaviest rains fall during the early months of the
year, and the lowest in August, when the ITCZ moves northward.211 Moving
longitudinally, regions within the moist ITCZ are not, of course, identical. In particular,
the equatorial region surrounding Malaysia, Indonesia and New Guinea – where there are
few large land areas and shallow seas – is one of especially intense convection and
precipitation, and the rising motion driving by latent heat release in this region generates
a powerful circulation system of the tropical atmosphere characterized by east-west
circulation cells along the equator with large regions of rising warm and moist air in the
Indonesian, South American and African regions, and subsiding, dry air in between. The
largest of these east-west equatorial circulation cells, known as the Walker Circulation,
extends across the Pacific Ocean.212
Where air is subsiding along the belt between 10 to 40 degrees latitude, rainfall is
suppressed, and it is in this region where many of the world’s great deserts are found.
Moving further poleward, much seasonal climate is driven by the differential response of
oceans and continents to seasonal variations in solar insolation: relative to the oceans,
land surfaces warm up more rapidly in the summer and cool more rapidly in the winter,
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giving rise to a long term predictable pattern where high pressure centers form over the
oceans in summer and over the continents in winter (and vice versa for low pressure
centers). The seasonal movement of maximum insolation across hemispheres likewise
accounts for the monsoon, a seasonal change in wind direction that generates dramatic
shifts in precipitation across many parts of Africa, Asia and Australia. In the Asian
monsoon, heating of the Tibetan plateau in the summer generates persistent low pressure
that sucks in warm, moist air from the ocean, generating large amounts of rainfall; in the
winter, the pattern is reversed.
However brief and incomplete, this summary of how the general circulation
patterns of the earth’s atmosphere account for regional climate should suffice to show the
tremendous complexity that climate models need to incorporate in order to predict how
surface and tropospheric warming will alter regional climate. An accumulating body of
work seems to indicate that climate models have no consistent ability to reproduce past
general circulation patterns, and correspondingly have huge variation in their future
projections. For example, Tanaka et al. show that while the multi-model ensemble mean
reproduction of the 20th century Hadley circulation intensity is only slightly weaker than
the best currently available actual observed value for that variable, the ensemble mean of
both the Walker circulation and the Asian monsoon circulations are “considerably
weaker” than those which were observed during the 20th century.213 GCM models predict
potentially very large weakening in the Hadley, Walker and monsoon circulations during
the 21st century (e.g., an ensemble mean predicted weakening of 9% for the Hadley
circulation, with one model predicting a 54% weakening). Tanaka et al. conclude that
both past reproductions and future projections of these key tropical circulation patterns
have a “high degree of model-dependent sensitivity,” and GCM models have a “poor
capability of reproducing and predicting the topical circulation.”214
As explained above, to account for global circulation patterns, GCM models would
need to accurately account for both tropical Hadley cell circulation as well as higher
latitude stationary and transient eddy fluxes. Recent work by Caballero,215 however,
demonstrates enormous intermodal variation – with ranges exceeding 50% -- in simulated
20th century Hadley cell and tropical eddy flux. There are, consequently, enormous
variations across models – of up to 8 degree centigrade and 40% respectively – in
simulated tropical temperatures and humidity. 216 Caballero shows that there is a strong
correlation between a model’s simulated Hadley cell strength and its simulated stationary
eddy stress, so that bias in one implies bias in both and hence a “significant bias in
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tropical temperature and humidity.”217 Although the multi-model mean simulation of
subtropical eddy stress does agree “very well” with observations, there “currently appears
to be no useful observational constraint of the Hadley cell.” Caballero’s study concludes
with a series of puzzles and currently unanswerable questions: why do transient eddy
stresses, of comparable magnitude in the southern and northern hemisphere, seem to
explain a lot of the variation in southern hemisphere Hadley cell strength across models
but explain very little of the variation in simulated northern hemisphere Hadley cell
strength? Are biases in simulated tropical eddy stress due to errors in simulating
extratropical eddy strength, or do biases in tropical wave simulations indirectly generate
biases in subtropical eddy flux simulations? These are vitally important questions,
according to Caballeros, for as he explains “[i]f it turns out that tropical biases are in fact
mostly forced from the extratropics, then ‘tuning’ of model parameterisations (sic) locally
in the tropics will, at best, give the right climate for the wrong reasons.”
Regional climate projections – a hallmark of the most recent IPCC Fourth
Assessment perhaps the most widely publicized and policy relevant of all IPCC
projections – hinge crucially upon the changes in global circulation patterns predicted by
GCM models. While it is true that the Caballeros study just discussed was published
after the publication of the 2007 AR, that report emphasized (in the Summary for
Policymakers) that “there is now higher confidence in projected patterns of warming and
other regional-scale features, including changes in wind patterns, precipitation and some
aspects of extremes.” 218 Yet it seems that well before the 2007 AR was put out, climate
scientists well understood the lack of agreement among climate models regarding the
circulation pattern predictions underlying regional climate projections.
Consider, for example, the intensively publicized projections that global warming
will cause the western and southwestern United States to become much more drought
prone. In the most recent generation of GCM climate models, southwestern and western
drought would not be a direct consequence of global warming, but rather of changed
global atmospheric general circulation patterns induced by global surface and sea surface
temperature increases.
As explained in more detail by climate scientist Richard Seager:
“Global average precipitation increases with global warming induced by rising
greenhouse gases. This occurs because increased infrared radiation from the
atmosphere to the surface has to be balanced by increased surface heat loss, which
occurs primarily by increased evaporation. For the global average increased
evaporation must be balanced by increased precipitation. Regionally, precipitation
can be reduced as a consequence of greenhouse climate change due to changes in
atmosphere circulation that suppress precipitation by inducing subsidence. For the
American West the important question is whether rising greenhouse gases will
induce an El Nino-like or La Nina-like response in the tropical Pacific. The
217
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former will mean increased precipitation and the latter decreased precipitation in
addition to whatever other changes are induced by warming and other circulation
responses…Currently climate models are all over the map in how the tropical
Pacific Ocean responds to rising greenhouse gases.”219
Now climate models cannot accurately forecast El Nino events. As explained by
Richard Lindzen, climate scientists are “pretty sure” that this predictive inability
“involves the fact that the oceans are never in equilibrium with the surface. Irregular
exchanges of heat between the deep abyssal waters and the near surface thermocline
regions imply that the oceans serve as large sources and sinks of heat for the atmosphere,
and these exchanges take place over time scales from months to centuries or longer…”220
Whatever the reason for the models’ failure, because the El Nino-La Nina phenemoenon
is such a major determinant of interannual rainfall patterns in especially the southwestern
U.S., it might seem that Seager would have to conclude that climate models simply
cannot say anything credible about whether or not global warming will lead to drought in
the southwestern U.S.
This is not so. First, although clearly in the minority, there are GCM’s that
predict that global warming will lead to more frequent La Nina conditions that
themselves generate drought in the southwestern U.S.221 Most recently, Seager and his
colleagues have found support for the hypothesis of a more drought prone southwestern
U.S. in the projection of some GCM’s that global warming will move the Hadley cell
circulation and mid-latitude westerlies poleward, thus robbing the southwestern U.S. of
ocean moisture and subjecting it to very stable drying descending air.222 Seager et. al.
conclude that “while the most severe future droughts will still occur during persistent La
Nina events, …they will be worse than any since the Medieval period, because the La
Nina conditions will be perturbing a base state that is drier than any experienced
recently.”223
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Hence when one takes the time to really look at the climate science literature, one
finds that the highly publicized projection that global warming will make the
southwestern U.S. much more drought-prone depends upon projected changes in global
circulation patterns. But that literature also reveals that climate models fail to reproduce
most of the important observed global circulation patterns – especially in the tropics –
and that there is enormous disagreement across models. One wonders how the public and
policymakers would react to projections of increased drought if they were simultaneously
told by media messengers that those projections rest upon climate model projections of
changes in global circulation patterns that are surrounded by such fundamental
uncertainty.
2. Internal Variability, or Chaotic Climate.
By the 1990’s, climatologists had recognized distinct cycles in the Pacific oceanatmosphere system, one occurring every fifty years or so (multi-decadal) and another
occurring at the frequency of about every one or two decades (decadal).224 There are a
variety of competing explanations for the decadal cycle,225 with perhaps the bestsupported being that warm sea surface temperature anomalies begin in the eastern
(northern) tropical Pacific and then propagate eastward (through anomalous Northern
Pacific atmospheric cyclonic activity).226 Climate scientists do not yet know what causes
the subsurface sea temperature anomalies.227 To the contrary, the literature suggests that
both the decadal and multi-decadal cycles are not caused by anything external to the
global climate system, but rather are simply a manifestation of a natural oscillation in the
ocean-atmosphere system.228
What climate scientists seem to be very certain about is that changes in tropical
Pacific sea surface temperatures have a major impact on global climate,229 and that major
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climatic regime shifts230 have occurred in the 1920’s, the 1940’s and the late 1970’s.231 It
has been shown that these periods of very rapid and major climate regime shifts have
been times when the decadal and multi-decadal Pacific cycles synchronized and
interacted.232 Significant cooling was observed in regions of North America, Canada and
Alaska observed in the 1940’s, and significant warming observed over those places after
the 1970’s regime shift.233
The most recent climate regime shift occurred in 1976/77. In 1976 – in an event
termed the “Great Pacific Climate Shift”234 -- sea surface temperatures in the tropical
Pacific abruptly increased by nearly 1 degree centigrade over the period of just one
year.235 Within a few years, global mean surface air temperature increased by about .2
degrees centigrade, this after a period of almost 30 years when global mean surface air
temperature had been stable or slightly falling.236 This abrupt .2 degree centigrade
temperature increase accounts for 40 per cent of the roughly .5 degree centigrade increase
in global mean surface air temperature over the last 50 years.237 The late 1970’s warming
“brought sweeping long-range changes in the climate of [the] northern hemisphere.
Incidentally, after ‘the dust settled,’ a new long era of frequent El Ninos superimposed on
sharp global temperature increase begun (sic).”238
On the model of intrinsic climatic cycles,239 whether there is an abrupt climate
regime shift in the offing depends upon whether or not the next bi-decadal Pacific phase
shift does or does not occur simultaneously with the next multi-decadal phase shift. If the
two cycles are indeed linked, then according to some climate scientists, there is reason to
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believe that they may have occurred synchronously within the past few years, and that we
are already in the midst of a multi-decadal cooling period.240
Regardless of whether such a large scale synchronization of the earth’s various
regional circulation systems has occurred, climate scientists now have very good
evidence that the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle can itself account for a
great deal of the variation in both global and regional surface temperatures that has
occurred since 1960. McLean et al.241 show that regardless of which lower tropospheric
temperature measure is used, there is a distinct delayed relationship between the state of
the ENSO cycle and tropospheric temperatures across the globe. McLean et al. find that
the onset of an El Nino triggers an increase in global surface temperatures, while La Nina
events are followed by falling average surface temperatures. Strikingly, they find that the
global impact of El Nino events extends to the Arctic, correlating very strongly with
periods of Arctic warming and decreases in sea ice extent. While the direction of
causality is, according to McLean et al., “unclear,” what is clear is that since the Great
Pacific Climate Shift of 1976, the ENSO cycle has exhibited a pronounced bias toward
warming El Nino events.
McLean et al. conclude by distinguishing their findings from those of Lean and
Rind, who use techniques of linear regression to argue that no natural processes – not
even ENSO – could account for overall warming in late 20th century global temperatures.
According to McLean et al., the temperature data set used by Lean and Rind, which was
different than that used by McLean et al., caused them to underestimate temperatures
immediately following a very important El Nino event and to overestimate temperatures
following an important La Nina event of that century, thus suppressing the impact of
ENSO cycles on global temperature observed by Lean and Rind.
242

Thus, as we have seen with other climate science controversies, resolution of the
role of ENSO in explaining 20th century climate variation would seem to await agreement
on a standardized temperature dataset used by all researchers. But it is crucial to
understand that if further research reveals that ENSO or other cycles that are intrinsic to
the global climate system are indeed a primary driver of global climate cycles, then the
utility of climate models may be very limited. This is succinctly but comprehensively
explained by climate scientist Richard Lindzen:
“There are, in fact, numerous phenomena that current models fail to replicate at
anywhere near the magnitudes observed. These range from the Intraseasonal
Oscillations in the tropics (sometimes referred to as Madden-Julian Oscillation, and
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having time scales on the order of 40-60 days) to El Nino (involving time scales of
several years) to the Quasi-biennial Oscillation of the tropic stratosphere to longer
time scale phenomena of the Little Ice Age and the Medieval Warm Period
(involving centuries). Under the circumstances, it seems reasonable to suppose that
some things must exist that account for these model failures …There is, in fact, no
reason to suppose current models are treating such matters adequately…the current
models fail to describe many known climate changes, and…therefore, the models’
failure to account for the recent warming (largely confined to the period 19761995) hardly requires the invocation of anthropogenic forcing. It is nonetheless
commonly argued by modelers that coupled models (even with passive mixed layer
oceans) do adequately portray the natural unforced variability [citation omitted]
despite acknowledging the cited shortcomings, and it may reasonably be claimed
that this contention is the fundamental assumption behind the iconic claim of the
last IPCC [that most of the observed warming is due to man].”243
The question is not whether any of the most recent work on intrinsic climate
variability that I have discussed, or Lindzen’s summary of that literature, will ultimately
be found to have accurately captured the most important mechanisms of intrinsic climate
variability. The question instead is whether any person who is even somewhat informed
about this literature and the shortcomings of climate models in capturing intrinsic
variability could possibly accept the IPCC’s recent summary statement that “[t]here is
also increased confidence that natural internal variability cannot account for the observed
changes, due in part to improved studies that warming occurred in both oceans and
atmosphere, together with observed ice mass losses.”244 I believe that the answer to this
question is clearly “no”: that to anyone with a passing knowledge of literature, the
IPCC’s statement seems to exaggerate or “oversell” current understanding of mechanisms
of intrinsic climate variability, and, even more importantly, of the ability of climate
models to capture those mechanisms.
3. Solar variation.
The literature reveals three ways in which variations in solar activity might
influence the earth’s climate.245 The first and most direct is through fluctuations in the
output of solar heat and light (total solar irradiance, or TSI). Until quite recently it was
thought that the solar cycle correlates with climate cycles.246 It is now believed that over
the short, 11-year term of the sunspot cycle, variation in TSI is too small—currently
believed to be only around .05% or even less—to effect climate.247 Moreover, at such
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short time scales, the dampening effect of the oceans is so great that even a larger solar
variation could not be expected to impact global surface temperature.248
Work during the 1990’s suggested that over longer multi-decadal, centennial or
millennial periods, there might well be larger variations in TSI that could affect earth’s
climate.249This work drew inferences from findings regarding other stars, and therefore
presumed that the Sun was similar to other stars that exhibit a long term, low frequency
variation in luminosity. Recent observations have brought that presumption under
controversy.250 It may be that even over longer multi-decadal or centennial time scales,
variations in TSI are too small to impact climate even at these longer time scales.251
But variation in TSI is not the only mechanism by which variation in solar activity
might affect the earth’s climate. Two other mechanisms have been posited: first, that
much larger variations in solar ultraviolet irradiance indirectly influence the troposphere
(and climate) via their influence on the stratosphere; and, second, that air ions generated
by (fluctuating) cosmic rays alter cloud production.252 While the latter effect is
apparently controversial and not well understood, there is both empirical evidence for and
model simulations predicting a relatively strong influence of variations in solar UV
radiation on global atmospheric circulation patterns.253 On centennial time scales,
moreover, there is abundant evidence of a strong relationship between solar activity and
global surface temperature. From 1890 until about 1970, the number of sunspots and
total solar flux steadily increased along with mean global surface temperature; during a
slightly longer period (up until 1985), there was a very close correlation between comic
ray production and global mean surface temperature. (It has been conjectured that
decreased levels of cosmic rays cause a decrease in low-level, primarily reflective lowlevel clouds.)254 Over even longer, millennial time scales, there is so far unassailable
evidence of a very strong positive relationship between levels of solar irradiance and
fundamental mechanisms of global climate such as the location of the jet stream and the
strength of the North Hadley circulation cell.255 This work supports earlier millennial
scale work that has recounted evidence that periods of reduced solar irradiance
corresponded to Holocene-era glacial advances, to expansions in polar circulation above
Greenland, and to an abrupt cooling that occurred in the Netherlands about 2700 years
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ago.256
Despite all of the evidence that solar variation does indeed influence earth’s
climate, there are scientists who have long been and still remain skeptical that solar
variation can really be so important to the sun-dependant earth’s climate. Among the
most prominent of such scientific skeptics appear to be Peter Foukal and Tom Wigley. In
a recent review article, they downplay both the possibility that variation in solar UV rays
or cosmic rays – rather than in TSI per se – account for the influence of solar variation,
saying that the “proposed indirect mechanisms” are “complex, and involved subtle
interactions between the troposphere, stratosphere and even high layers of the Earth’s
atmosphere that are much less well understood than the direct radiative forcing effect.
Modeling of such interactions is proceeding rapidly, but incisive tests of the models will
be required to achieve certainty.”257 And as for the so-far unassailable evidence of the
millennial scale influence of solar variability on global climate, they say that as “no
specific mechanism has been identified so far to generate millennial-scale solar irradiance
variations,…[b]etter reconstructions of global temperature and solar activity will be
required to investigate further the apparent relationships between climate and solar
activity as seen over the past millennium and through the Holocene, particularly if the
signature of any solar influence is spatially restricted”258 (Here, they allude to the fact
that Bond et al. reported a close correspondence between solar variation and particular
North Atlantic climate mechanisms.)
It might seem that whatever might be the explanation for the apparent long-term
impact of solar variation on climate, the IPCC stood on unassailable ground in
concluding in its 2007 AR that solar variation had the effect of cooling the planet since
1980, so that solar variation could not possibly account for warming since then. There is
certainly evidence for the IPCC’s conclusion.259 But, as we have seen with several other
crucial issues in climate science, the debate in fact has continued because a number of
prominent climate scientists question whether the IPCC was looking at the right data.
Scafetta and Wilson260 have recently argued for the superior accuracy of one of the two
primary measurements total solar irradiance (TSI), and their preferred dataset shows that
rather than falling or remaining constant, TSI increased significantly over the period
1986-1996. Scafetta has even more recently argued that when one allows for an
appropriately long lag, variations in TSI can in fact explain “most” of the decadal and
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secular variability in global mean surface temperatures since 1600, including the period
since 1980.261
As with other contested issues in climate science, Scafetta and Wilson’s view that
the variability in TSI has a significant impact on climate, accounting for a good bit of the
warming since 1980 in particular, has been met with vigorous and virtually instantaneous
rebuttal climate scientists who have been leaders in establishing the activist CO2 primacy
view (in this case, Duffy, Santer and Wigley).262 Part of the argument against solar
variability is that variations in TSI cannot account for observed changes, such as the
relative cooling of the stratosphere since about 1950; but the primary argument made by
Duffy et al. against solar variation as causing late 20th century warming is that a different
and allegedly more accurate dataset measuring TSI shows that there was no increase in
TSI since 1980.263 Leaving the ultimate question of which dataset is indeed more accurate
aside, it is still interesting to note that Duffy et al. did not attempt to defend their choice
of a dataset by questioning the arguments made in Scafetta and Wilson’s technical, peerreviewed paper on TSI measurements.
4. Black Carbon (Soot)
In its Summary for Policymakers and Technical Summary accompanying its 2007
AR, the IPCC had very little to say about soot, or black carbon, but what it did say was
that although the deposition of black carbon (soot) on snow reduced surface albedo
(reflectivity), such deposition was estimated to generate a global warming of only .1
W/m2, a warming about which scientists had only a “low” level of understanding.264 As
the actual 2007 AR explained, in the atmosphere, “black carbon strongly absorbs solar
radiation,” meaning that black carbon in the atmosphere also causes warming, which the
2007 AR estimated at about .2 W.m2.265 Thus, according to the IPCC’s 2007 AR, the two
effects of black carbon, or soot, added up to a net warming of .3 W/m2, a relatively low
value when compared with the 1.66 W.m2 warming value given to CO2 by the IPCC.266
However, in research that was published around the same time as the release of the
2007 AR (and which therefore was likely available in unpublished form well before this),
Flanner et al. generated revised estimates of the warming impact of black carbon
deposition on snow that showed black carbon deposition was a significantly more
powerful global warming force than CO2, indeed three times more powerful, and had
resulted in an Arctic surface warming of between .5 and 1 degree centigrade over the
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previous century.267 Moreover, in research published in 2001, six years before the 2007
AR, Jacobson explored the evolution of the chemical composition of aerosols in the
atmosphere and found that black carbon was likely to be incorporated within other
aerosols in the atmosphere (due to the way aerosol particles coagulate and grow),
implying a much higher positive, warming impact from black carbon in the atmosphere
than previously thought.268 The very next year, 2002, Jacobson reported results showing
that through a variety of mechanisms, black carbon “warmed the air 360,00-840,00 times
more effectively per unit of mass than did CO2.”269 That same year, in a Science
magazine “Perspectives” article, Chameides and Bergin summarized the ongoing
research into the warming impact of black carbon as suggesting that if black carbon was
indeed an important contributor to atmospheric warming, then climate model simulations
that somehow managed to reproduce 20th century temperature trends without even
including black carbon might not be “meaningful.”270
By the summer of 2007, climate scientist Charles Zender was suggesting to
Scientific American magazine that as much as 94 percent of warming in the Arctic over
the last 100 years due to the deposition of black carbon on snow and ice in that region.271
Finally, about a year after the appearance of the IPCC’s 2007 Assessment Report, a
review article by Ramanthan and Carmichal was published in which the authors
estimated that the warming from black carbon was .9W/m2 and noted that “similar
conclusions regarding the large magnitude of [black carbon] forcing” had been “inferred”
by four papers published over the period 1998 to 2003, papers whose own estimates
ranged from .4 W/m2 to 1.2 W/m2.272
Recalling that the IPCC had given an estimate for black carbon forcing of only .3-.4
2
W/m in its 2007 AR, it seems that in that 2007 AR, the IPCC had chosen what was in
fact the lowest value in work published over the preceding decade for the estimated
contribution of black carbon to global warming. Moreover, unmentioned by the IPCC’s
2007 AR was the enormous fraction of highly publicized arct ic warming that was by
then estimated to have been caused not by CO2, but by garden-variety industrial soot, or
black carbon. Since the IPCC’s own 2007 estimate for CO 2 – induced warming was only
1.66 W/m2, if the 2008 estimate for warming due to black carbon of .9W/m2 is correct,
then the IPCC’s 2007 report may well have downplayed a factor – black carbon – that
was in fact a very substantial contributor to 20th century warming, and an even more
important – indeed the most important – factor in 20th century arctic warming. Finally,
since climate models omit black carbon, recent work showing black carbon to be a very
267
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strong agent of global warming adds weight to the belief that if climate models are
explaining 20th century warming trends as due solely to increases in CO2, then they must
be vastly overestimating the sensitivity of climate to increases in CO2.

E. Glossing over Serious and Deepening Controversies Over Methodological Validity:
The Example of Projected Species Loss
As an example of this particular rhetorical technique, consider the quantitative
prediction, set forth in the IPCC Working Group II’s Summary for Policymakers, that 2030% of species worldwide will be at risk of extinction due to global warming. When one
looks at the literature, one discovers that at least some biologists believe that this
prediction relies upon an entirely novel and extremely controversial methodology.
In its April, 2007 “Summary for Policymakers,”273 the IPCC Working Group on
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability proclaimed that “[a]pproximately 20-30% of plant
and animal species assessed thus far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction if
increases in global temperature exceed 1.5 – 2.5°C.” The IPCC failed to release the actual
report ostensibly being summarized in the “Summary for Policymakers,” and so at the
time it was published, and for months afterward, it was not possible for anyone not on the
IPCC Working Group II to even determine which studies were being cited in support of
this conclusion. But finally, in July of 2007, the IPCC Working Group II did release its
full report. That report explains that the IPCC prediction of a 20-30% decline in species
is based on “correlative models” that “use knowledge of the spatial distribution of species
to derive functions…or algorithms…that relate the probability of their occurrence to
climatic and other factors.”274 The report observes that these methods have been
criticized for: 1) assuming equilibrium between species and current climate; 2) being
unable to account for species interactions; 3) failing to specify a physiological
mechanism explaining the dependence of species on climate; and, 4) failing to take
account of population dynamics and species migration.275 To a layperson, these sound
like pretty serious problems, but IPCC Report assures the reader that these “correlative
methods nonetheless “provide a pragmatic first-cut assessment of risk to species decline
and extinction.”276
In support of its assertion that the statistical correlation between species and
climate provides a “pragmatic first-cut assessment of risk to species decline and
extinction,” the IPCC Report cites a single study. It is true that this study, by Thomas et.
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al.,277 employs “correlative methods” to predict how climate change will impact species
extinction risk. But it doesn’t simply calculate the statistical correlation between some
set of climate variables and then use predicted changes in the climate variables to predict
changes in species distribution. Rather, as summarized by its authors, the study by
Thomas et. al. is based on the species-area relationship, a model in which the probability
of extinction has a power law relationship to geographical range size.278 For the regions
studied by Thomas et. al. (which make up about 20 per cent of the earth’s surface) even
mid-range climate warming will reduce range sizes by 2050: quite straightforwardly, if
average temperature increases everywhere on the earth, then a greater land area will be
relatively warm, compared to today, while less land area will be relatively cool,
compared to today. If, as the species-area relationship maintains, the number of species
is (log-linearly) related to range size, then a reduction in the land area of relatively warm
ranges must reduce the number of species who inhabit such ranges. Plugging the
reduction in area due to climate change into the species-area relationship, Thomas et. al.
find that between 15 and 37% of earth’s species will be “committed to extinction” by
even mid-range global warming.279
Because these models “offer the advantage of assessing climate change impacts
on biodiversity quantitatively,” the IPCC adopts their quantitative predictions.280 But the
IPCC’s passing acknowledgement that the climate envelope (species-area based)
approach to modeling the impact of climate change on species extinction risk has
“limitations” seemingly ignores much stronger criticism of this methodology among
biologists. Oxford zoologist Owen Jones, for example, has noted that the species-area
relationship method used by Thomas et. al. “conceals a number of assumptions and
complications”281 and “problematic…uncertainties concerning the usefulness of climate
envelope models for predicting ranges under different climate change scenarios.”282
According to Owens, these “problematic” uncertainties and complications, include:
i) Uncertainty about “how many distributions are truly governed by climate.” As
Owens explains, the “widespread ability of species to persist if transplanted or introduced
outside their current range and simulated climatic envelope suggests that this is often not
the case,” with the ecological niches currently occupied by species “considerably
narrower than the fundamental niches that a species can occupy in isolation.” As he says,
while we do not have the evidence to predict precisely how these changes will occur, “the
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set of interacting species at any particular locality will not be a simple reconstruction of
the community composition observed at other localities before climate change.”283
ii) Although “pessimists” believe that it is unlikely that organisms can “evolve
rapidly enough to adapt to changing environmental conditions,” there is evidence that
precisely this has occurred in “some” insects and “at least” one species of plant.284
iii) While stating their calculated extinction probabilities “were specific to the
regions and species included in the study,” Thomas et. al., “interpret their results as
though they are global estimates….Even if predictions for the specific taxa and regions
included in the study are accurate, the extrapolation to a global scale may be misleading.”
Most seriously, perhaps, the method adopted by Thomas et. al. necessarily limited their
analysis to endemics, “species whose ranges fall entirely within the particular study
areas,” but such endemic species are likely to have particularly small ranges, and “it is
well known that species with small ranges are particularly prone to extinctions.”285
iv) Although only a “small fraction” of species studied by Thomas et. al., are from
tropical forests, “these forests account for over 50% of terrestrial biodiversity (perhaps
considerably more) and may be less affected by climate change than habitats at higher
latitudes.”286
v) Finally, and perhaps most strikingly to my layperson’s sensibilities, the
methodology employed by Thomas et. al. will “inevitably detect extinctions. Negative
changes in the size of a species’ range contribute to an increased extinction risk overall,
while positive changes have no net effect on extinctions,” this despite the fact that
locally, “the net effect on diversity at any one locality might well be positive, as species
spread towards the poles from the most species-rich habitats near the equator.”287
Owens concludes his discussion of the Thomas et. al. study by noting that
although Thomas et. al. “tend to emphasize the factors that may make their predictions
too low,” the species-area method they utilize in fact “conceals a hotchpotch of
assumptions, extrapolations, approximations and estimates that combine to generate
considerable uncertainty…about the likely magnitude of extinctions caused by climate
change.”288
The article by Owens cannot be dismissed as the views of a single and potentially
outlying critic. In a summary article entitled “Forecasting the Effects of Global Warming
on Biodiversity”, Botkin et al.289 – a team of no fewer than 18 biologists from around the
world -- noted a number of serious limitations of the kind of model used to forecast
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species loss by Thomas et al. (generally called bioclimatic envelope models). The 18
biologist co-authors explained how the limitations of such models include the assumption
that observed species distributions are “in equilibrium with their current environment,
and that therefore species become extinct outside the region where the environment,
including the climate, meets their present or assumed requirements,” but this assumption
contradicts the existing data and observations that “show species have survived in small
areas of unusual habitat, or in habitats that are outside their well-established geographic
range but actually meet their requirements.” Botkin et al. conclude that such models in
general are “likely to overestimate extinctions, even when they realistically suggest
changes in the range of many species,” while the Thomas et al. study in particular “may
have greatly overestimated the probability of extinction…”290
According to two other peer-edited reviews of the “bioclimatic” models
underlying the Thomas et al. species loss probability number – both of which appeared
around or before the time of the IPCC’s 2007 AR4 -- “the problems associated with the
present distribution of species are so numerous and fundamental that common ecological
sense should caution us against putting much faith in relying on their findings for further
extrapolations,”291 and the bioclimatic models used for future predictions are “based on
some problematic ecological assumptions."292 Given the extensive and foundational
criticism by biologists of the methodology underlying the species loss probability
prediction generated by Thomas et al., the IPCC’s publication of that probability without
qualification seems dangerously misleading, and in any event clearly exemplifies the
rhetoric of adversarial persuasion, rather than “unbiased” assessment.
F. Exaggerate in the Name of Caution: Sea Level Scare Stories versus the Accumulating
Evidence
Of all the potential negative consequences from global warming, sea level rise has
been perhaps the most dramatically advertised. In a review essay entitled “The Threat to
the Planet,”293 climate scientist and NASA Goddard Institute Director Jim Hansen—
perhaps the most publicly visible climate scientist and certainly the one most often
quoted by the popular press – opined that of all the threats from climate change, the
“greatest” is the potential melting of the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica and the
consequent increase in global sea level.294 Hansen takes as his rhetorical reference point
what the IPCC and others have called the business-as-usual scenario, under which annual
emissions of CO2 and other ghg’s continue to increase at their current rate for at least fifty
years. Given such an increase, Hansen says that both climate models and paleoclimatic
data from ice cores predict that in fifty years this increase in ghg’s will increase the
earth’s average temperature by about 5 degrees Fahrenheit relative to today. According
to Hansen, the ice core data also show that the last time that the Earth was five degrees
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warmer than now (three million years ago), sea level was about eighty feet higher.
Hansen describes the consequences of an eighty foot increase in sea level in catastrophic
terms:
“Eighty feet! In that case, the United States would lose most East Coast cities:
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington and Miami; indeed practically the
entire state of Florida would be under water. Fifty million people in the U.S. live
below that sea level. Other places would fare far worse. China would have 250
million displaced persons. Bangladesh would produce 120 million refugees,
practically the entire nation. India would lose the land of 150 million people.”295
Much could be said about the rather complex relationship between the eighty foot
increase that Hansen predicts in this article for the popular press and what the evidence
on sea level change actually shows.296 Hansen’s eighty foot increase in sea level is not
without technical support, but that support comes from data on the impact on sea level of
the melting of the last great deglaciation.297 That data show that the melting of the vast
ice-age glaciers generated a rise in sea level of eighty feet in 500 years, with annual rates
of increase sometimes exceeding 40 mm/yr. The continental ice sheets are of course
much smaller today than they were during the last ice age. Moreover, the most recent
paleoclimatic evidence shows that between 129,000 and 118,000 years ago, when
summertime temperatures in Greenland were between 3.5 and 5 degrees centigrade
(between 6 and 9 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer than today, sea level was 4 to 6 meters
295
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higher than today.298 It has been conjectured that rates of sea level rise of up to 1 meter
per century (10 mm/yr) occurred during that period.299
Thus even under the upper end of the IPCC business-as-usual forecast for
temperature increase in Greenland of 10 degrees centigrade, it is difficult to see how
Hansen’s 80 foot sea level increase in a single century is possibly consistent with the
existing evidence. In fact, while poorly understood, given the existing state of the
modeling, the most recent evidence on rates of deglaciation and sea level rise tend to
show much more modest sea level increases and a more complex picture of ice melt than
Hansen portrays. As for sea level rise, in its 2007 Assessment Report, the IPCC
endorsed studies estimating that over the past 50 years, global sea level has been rising at
a rate of about 1.8mm/year, and at a rate of 3 mm/year since 1993.300 Even under
relatively pessimistic assumptions about continuing increases in ghg’s, assumptions that
eventually generate an annual sea level increase of 4 mm/year, the IPCC’s 2007 AR
projected an increase in global sea level of at most .44 meters, or about a foot and a half,
by 2090.301 Since then, a number of studies have appeared that tend to show that the
IPCC may not have been as conservative as it claimed: Holgate302 estimated that the sea
level rise during the early twentieth century was 2.0 mm/year, much larger than the 1.45
mm/year estimate he found for the latter half of the twentieth century; Jevrejeva et al.303
find evidence that the sea level increase began over 200 years ago; Woppleman et al.304
find that sea level as measured at one stable tide gauge location has been increasing at
constant rate for the last 100 years; using a wide variety of different sea level measures,
Wunsch et al.305 come up with an estimate of an increase of 1.6 mm/year over the period
1993-2004 (versus the 3 mm/year estimate used by the IPCC in 2007). Perhaps most
important is Wunsch et al.’s conclusion:306
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“At best, the determination and attribution of global-mean sea level change lies at
the very edge of knowledge and technology. The most urgent job would appear
to be the accurate determination of the smallest temperature and salinity changes
that can be determined with statistical significance, given the realities of both the
observation base and modeling approximations. …It remains possible that the
database is insufficient to compute mean sea level trends with the accuracy
necessary to discuss the impact of global warming – as disappointing as this
conclusion may be.”
As for ice loss, remote sensing data from satellite and laser altimetry depict a
variegated picture in both Greenland and Antarctica: in Greenland, there is accelerated
ice loss in coastal areas but a slight mass gain in inland high elevation areas; in
Antarctica, accelerated ice mass loss in the western part of the continent, but a slight ice
mass gain in the eastern part as a result of increased snowfall.307
G. A Theory That Cannot be Disconfirmed: Sea Level Scare Stories and The Continuing
Off-Model Private Prognostications of Climate Change Scientist/Advocates
While the IPCC’s consensus projections generally correspond to what the mean or
median GCM predicts (more on this below), the Reports are careful to at least mention
more extreme and harmful future scenarios that one or more climate models suggest as
being at least possible. Unsurprisingly, some leading establishment climate scientists
clearly believe that more attention should be paid to possible global warming worst-case
scenarios, even if those scenarios are only weakly supported, if at all, by the existing
peer-edited literature. Hence, in a rhetorical strategy obviously closely related to the
strategy of exaggeration just discussed, many leading climate change scientist/advocates
have waged a continuing campaign that involves publicizing their own personal opinions
that even moderate global warming may have catastrophic consequences.
Sea level rise once again provides a dramatic illustration of this strategy. Recall
that the IPCC’s 2007 Physical Science Assessment Report presents a “consensus”
estimate of 2100 sea level rise as somewhere between .18 and .6 meters.308 As the IPCC
Report explained, this consensus estimate would have been higher had it included
estimated sea level rise due to various feedbacks and dynamic effects, such as
accelerating flow and calving of glaciers that terminate in the sea. The IPCC excluded
such feedbacks and dynamic effects because “present understanding of the relevant
processes is too limited for reliable model estimates.”309
With advance notice of the IPCC’s relatively cautious prediction on sea level rise,
climate change advocates began arguing – shortly before the Report appeared -- in favor
of much larger and potentially more catastrophic increases in sea level. For example, in
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an “Editorial Essay” that appeared – somewhat incongruously – in the peer-edited journal
Climatic Change, James Hansen began by posing the frightening questions:
“Are we on a slippery slope now? Can human-made global warming cause ice
sheet melting measured in meters of sea level rise, not centimeters, and can this
occur in centuries, not millennia? Can the very inertia of the ice sheets, which
protects us from rapid sea level change now, become our bête noire as portions of
the ice sheet begin to accelerate, making it practically impossible to avoid disaster
for coastal regions?”310
Hansen notes that the existing climate models actually predict that with a doubling of
CO2 both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets will be growing at a rate equivalent to a
sea level fall of 12 cm per century, and that even studies that assume meltwater will
greatly accelerate ice sheet flow in Greenland still predict very small contributions of
such melting ice sheets to sea level rise.311 But he then goes on to state his opinion that
“the calculations do not yet fully and realistically incorporate important processes that
will accelerate ice sheet disintegration,” and supports his opinion by applying basic
principles of climate physics to a selective parsing of paleoclimatic evidence.312The
bottom line Hansen is driving toward is that “global warming of more than 1 degree C
above today’s global temperature would likely constitute ‘dangerous anthropogenic
interference’ with climate.”313
While less sustained, other activist climate scientists also effectively undercut the
2007 IPCC Report’s caution on sea level rise by preempting the published Report and
arguing for the serious possibility of abrupt and dramatic sea level rise. In a 2006 review
essay entitled “Abrupt Change in Earth’s Climate System,” Jonathan Overpeck – a
Coordinating Lead Author of the AR4 (on the paleo-climate chapter) -- and Julia Cole
argued that despite the IPCC’s consensus, “new evidence has emerged that ice sheets,
and thus global sea level, can respond more quickly to climate change, perhaps in an
abrupt manner.”314 Overpeck and Cole discuss precisely the same evidence that I cite
above – showing that during the last interglacial, sea levels were 4-6 meters higher than
today – but they emphasize that if the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet contributed
so much (as 3 meters) then, when there was only minor high-latitude Southern
Hemisphere warming, then that ice sheet “could be quite susceptible to collapse in the
future.”315
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Recent published work seems to cast increasing doubt on the prognostications of
catastrophic ice sheet collapse made by activists such as Hansen and Overpeck.316 While
some work has indeed identified possible physical mechanisms whereby warming
accelerates the flow of Greenland outlet glaciers into the sea,317 other work has shown
that this acceleration may be merely a short term phenomenon, with lower long term
(equilibrium) rates of glacier mass loss.318 In terms of the expected sea level rise, Pfeffer
et al.319, demonstrate that for sea level increases of 2 meters to be caused by 2100 solely
by increasingly rapid and dynamically unstable calving of Greenland ice sheets,
Greenland outlet glaciers would have to be outflowing at speeds between 22 and 40 times
the fastest speed ever observed by any glacier. They conclude that under high but
“reasonable” assumed rates of acceleration in ice sheet outflow in both Greenland and
Antarctica (an order of magnitude higher than today), estimated sea level rise by 2100 is
between .8 and 2 meters.320
Now a 2 meter sea level rise by 2100 is hardly insignificant and indeed could be
severely harmful for some developing and island nations in particular. But even 2 meters
pales in comparison with the 20 foot increase proclaimed by Hansen and the 4-6 meter
number discussed by Overpeck/Cole. With the advantage of the recent studies discussed
just a moment ago, one can put the criticism of the IPCC by Hansen in particular in
perspective: the IPCC projection may have been a bit conservative, but the numbers
suggested by Hansen seem increasingly fantastical.321 In this light, the kind of alarmist
prognostications made prior to the publication of IPCC AR’s by Hansen smack much
more of policy advocacy than actual scientific results.
As advocacy, such alarmist prognostications have the very important and
somewhat paradoxical consequence of buttressing the IPCC’s claim to objectivity. The
fact that some scientists have publicly opined that global warming is much more
dangerous than a forthcoming IPCC Report will conclude strengthens the case for the
IPCC as a sort of impartial judge. But this impression is highly misleading, for the
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Hansen and Overpeck/Cole essays are just that – essays expressing the opinions of
experts – rather than original scientific contributions. Through such essays, climate
change advocates essentially use their own expertise to set up an alternative, authoritative
evaluation of the existing scientific evidence prior to the publication of the IPCC’s own
evaluation. But this alternative explanation does not challenge the objectivity of the
IPCC. Instead, through such a strategy, climate change advocates benefit from the
IPCC’s image – as an objective assessor – on those issues upon which they agree with the
IPCC, while retaining the freedom to make their own, more dire prognostications on
issues such as sea level rise. As Hansen explains:
“…I disagree with the implication of Allen et al.322 that conclusions about climate
change should wait until the IPCC goes through a ponderous process, and that
verdicts reached by the IPCC are near gospel. IPCC conclusions, even after their
extensive review and publication, must be subjected to the same scientific process
as all others.
In the case at hand, I realize that I am no glaciologist and could be wrong
about the ice sheets. Perhaps, as [the IPCC’s 2001 Assessement Report] and
more recent global models suggest, the ice sheets are quite stable and may even
grow with doubling of CO2. I hope those authors are right. But I doubt it.”323
Upon further analysis, this excerpt becomes even more disturbing. For Hansen is
not only arguing, quite correctly in my view, that scientists should retain the freedom to
criticize IPCC conclusions. What he is doing is to deliver his personal opinion, as an
expert, in a way that seems highly likely to cause readers to confuse that opinion with a
scientific conclusion or result. That is, Hansen is not presenting any new data or
analysis, but just re-interpreting the models and evidence, without any particular
explanation or justification for that interpretation.
Hansen is by no means alone in adopting this approach. Many climate scientists
have responded to unexpected loss of Arctic sea ice by quickly stating their own opinions
that in light of such unexpected changes, it seems that existing models are too
conservative, and that ice loss will occur much more quickly than climate models, and the
IPCC, have projected. For example, when satellite data had revealed that the Arctic sea
ice pack had reached an all-time low after the summer of 2007, a senior research scientist
at the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center told the media that the loss was
“astounding” and that although models had predicted the complete disappearance of
summer Arctic ice by 2070, “losing summer ice cover by 2030 is not unreasonable.”324
Another researcher opined that “the strong reduction in just one year certainly flags that
the ice (in summer) may disappear much sooner than expected.”325 Even the official
website of NOAA seems to put a rhetorical slant on the information it conveys: in 2009,
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summer arctic sea ice continued to increase in extent relative to its 2007 all-time low, but
this increase – which could well be described as a trend back to the longer term norm – is
instead described as the “the third lowest value of the satellite record.”326
II. Behind the Rhetoric: Apparent Uncertainties and Questions in Climate Science and
their Policy Significance
The cross examination conducted in Part I has revealed a number of key questions
and uncertainties in climate science that are neglected, obscured, or minimized by the
establishment climate story. This section highlights some of the key questions and
uncertainties and briefly explicates their policy significance.
A. Climate Model Projections: It’s all about the feedbacks
Perhaps the most fundamental and policy-relevant projection supplied by climate
models is what is called the “sensitivity” -- the projected future temperature increase
from a doubling of CO2 of global mean surface temperature. It is the possibility of high
climate sensitivity that triggers the need for action, and the higher is the projected
temperature increase, the more worrisome is human-induced climate change.
The Part I cross examination has revealed that it is the positive feedback effects
presumed by climate models that accounts entirely for the possibility of climate
sensitivity greater than 1.2 degrees centigrade, and, perhaps most importantly, for the
possibility of very big, dangerous temperature increases exceeding even 5 degrees
centigrade. Yet the cross examination has also uncovered recent work showing that if
there is an important negative feedback that dissipates slowly over time, then the
probability of very large temperature increases due to the presence of positive feedbacks
is much smaller, and probabilities are much more concentrated around the more
moderate, mean values. Moreover, it is a very long time – exceeding 150 years -- before
there is a significant probability attached to a temperature increase even as large as 3
degrees centigrade.327
As for the evidence on feedback effects, the IPCC cites evidence tending to
confirm at least some of the important climate model feedbacks -- such as that regarding
constant tropospheric relative humidity and a consequently strong positive water vapor
feedback.328 A review of the literature, however, suggests that there is accumulating
evidence – some of which was available before the publication of the IPCC’s AR4 – that
atmospheric humidity and water vapor are not responding to CO2 increases as climate
models predict that they will. The studies relied upon by the IPCC seem to look at
different datasets than do the studies that fail to confirm climate model predictions. As
for the cloud feedback, the IPCC acknowledges the large remaining uncertainty about
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cloud feedbacks and the enormous spread – from strongly negative to strongly positive –
in climate model cloud feedback effects. Yet a comparison with the literature reveals that
the IPCC is almost surely much more optimistic about the improving accuracy of climate
model cloud feedbacks than are many leading climate scientists who study clouds and
climate change.
Rhetorically, the establishment climate story virtually ignores the systematic
importance of feedback effects to climate model projections. None of the IPCC
documents intended to influence the media, policymakers or even scientists generally
even mentions feedback effects. Beyond this, in work intended to influence such wide
and non-specialized audiences, activist climate scientists argue that all the evidence –
such as melting ice sheets – indicate that big positive feedback effects will be even worse
than climate models project. Such a presentation – no explanation for the general role
and assumptions about positive feedback effects in climate models and how those
compare with actual theoretical results and observational evidence in the literature,
coupled with dramatic proclamations that contemporaneous observations show that
feedbacks are likely worse than thought – would seem highly likely to lead to widespread
public misperception about the role of feedbacks in future climate projections.
Such a rhetorically-induced misperception about the role of feedback effects in
climate projections can have a profound impact on climate policy analysis. This is clearly
illustrated by two recent law review articles written by some of today’s most analytically
rigorous environmental scholars. In one of these articles, Freeman and Guzman argue
that climate change policy work has paid too little attention to the possibility of very
large temperature increases and the potentially catastrophic events that will be caused by
such temperature increases.329 As part of more general analysis of the role of how
feedback effects in a variety of natural and socio-economic systems create a positive
probability of catastrophic outcomes, Farber similarly argues that a positive probability of
extremely large temperature increases and a “non-negligible probability of worldwide
catastrophe” justify a “higher degree of precaution [as] “insurance” against climate
catastrophe.330 Thus both articles argue that a positive probability of very big
temperature increases – or, in climate science language, very high climate sensitivity –
and corresponding catastrophic harm justify immediate and large expenditures to reduce
ghg emissions.
Of these two, Farber’s article contains the more nuanced and detailed discussion
of the feedbacks that account for a positive probability of high climate sensitivity. Farber
relies heavily on a recent article by economist Martin Weitzman.331 Both Farber and
Wietzman are concerned with the “fat tail” –a positive probability of extreme high
climate sensitivity and very large, catastrophic warming. Weitzman is concerned with
temperature increases even bigger than 4.5 degrees centigrade, and is especially
concerned with temperature increases above 10 degrees centigrade, to which an ensemble
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of climate models that he inspects attach the average probability of about 1 per cent.332
He says that as we have no experience with such large temperature increases, the
inductive scientific method – by which he means learning from observations – cannot tell
us anything about this probability, which instead comes from a “largely subjective and
diffuse prior probability”333 and “significant uncertainties both in empirical
measurements and in the not directly observable coefficients plugged into simulation
models.” 334 Like Weitzman, Farber relies on the 2007 Science article by Roe and Baker
discussed earlier for the proposition that even a reduction in uncertainty about the
positive feedback would not reduce by much uncertainty about climate sensitivity, and so
the “fat tail” problem would still be with us.335
While both Farber and Weitzman are to be praised for actually looking closely at
climate science before discussing its policy implications, their discussion of the “fat tail”
– or positive probability of very high climate sensitivity – problem suffers from a number
of problems. First, both Farber and Weitzman discuss the standard range of climate
sensitivity – as between about 1.5 and 4.5 degrees centigrade – without once mentioning
that the range itself is due entirely to presumed net positive feedbacks.336 Their
discussions never explain why there is a range in the first place. Instead, they focus on
the role of feedbacks in generating temperature increases (climate sensitivity) above 4.5
degrees centigrade, and cite to the 2007 Science article by Roe and Baker for the
proposition that there is inevitable uncertainty about such feedbacks and reducing it will
not eliminate the “fat tail” probability of extreme climate sensitivity.337 They thus both
completely overlook the primary policy implication of Roe and Baker:338 because
climate models assume the predominance of positive feedbacks, they essentially assume
the fat tail problem. Weitzman’s belief that the “fat tail” comes from irreducible
uncertainty does not follow from anything in climate science: as discussed in Part I, there
is a large and growing literature that attempts to empirically measure the most important
feedbacks – water vapor and clouds in particular – that climate models presume to be
positive. Moreover, the significance of Baker and Roe’s most recent work339 is that if the
evidence shows that there are important negative feedbacks, then the fat tail of extreme
climate sensitivity does not arise for centuries (in the case of a slowly dissipating
negative feedback). In other words, if there are important negative feedbacks in the
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climate system which the climate models simply assume away but which we can learn
about from observations, then it may be that we will be able to predict that the climate
system will not, at least for centuries, reach the high temperatures that really would put us
into a state where the system might unpredictably and unknowably spiral out of control.
Needless to say, these crucially important policy implications of climate system
feedbacks cannot be traced unless one first has a very clear idea of how feedbacks drive
climate model projections. Rather than presenting such a clear story, in the IPCC’s
communications to policymakers, it said nothing about feedbacks except those that might
be dramatic and positive.
B. The Ability of Climate Models to Explain Past Climate
The IPCC and the climate establishment have vastly oversold climate models by
declaring that such models are able to quite accurately reproduce past climates, including
most importantly the warming climate of the late twentieth century. Mainstream climate
modelers have themselves explained that climate models disagree tremendously in their
predicted climate sensitivity – response of temperature to a CO2 increase – and are able to
reproduce twentieth century climate only by assuming whatever (negative) aerosol
forcing effect is necessary to get agreement with observations. These kind of
explanations, by leading climate modelers, suggest that climate models do not in fact
reflect understanding of the key physical climate processes well enough to generate
projections of future climate that one could rely upon.
It seems unlikely that climate model projections would be accorded much policy
significance if the way in which they were able to “reproduce” past climate was generally
understood. It seems more than plausible that policymakers (let alone the general
public), take a model’s purported ability reproduce past temperatures as an indication that
the model’s assumption about climate sensitivity is correct. If policymakers were told
that this is not so, that ability to reproduce past temperatures indicates only that a
particular pairing of assumptions about climate sensitivity and aerosol forcing allowed
the reproduction of past temperatures, then the logical question would be: which model
gets the correct pairing of sensitivity and aerosol forcing? In answer to this, climate
modelers would have to say that they do not know, and the best that could be done would
be to use all the models (this is called the ensemble approach). But of course it is
possible that all the models were very badly wrong in what they assumed about
sensitivity. A policymaker aware of this would then have to ask whether it would be
better to base policy on climate models, or a more naïve climate forecasting method, and
whether further public funding of efforts to improve climate models was worthwhile.
C. The Existence of Significant Alternative Explanations for Twentieth Century Warming
The IPCC and the climate establishment story expresses great certainty in arguing
that late twentieth century global warming was caused by the atmospheric buildup of
human ghg emissions (this is the anthropogenic global warming or AGW story). The
IPCC reports confidently assert that solar activity could not have accounted for warming
during this period, because this was a period of weakening and not strengthening solar
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irradiance, and that there was no natural forcing during this period that could have
accounted for the warming. Yet a closer look at the literature shows that there is ongoing
dispute about the possible role of the sun, with the debate coming down to conflicting
views about the reliability of alternative datasets on solar activity. Perhaps even more
importantly, a growing body of sophisticated theoretical work confirms that the nonlinear global climate is subject to inherent warm and cool cycles of about 20 to 30 years
in duration, with substantial evidence that a warm cycle was likely to have begun in
1976. As for the latitudinal pattern of twentieth century warming, with more pronounced
warming in the Arctic in particular, there is now substantial evidence establishing that at
least one half of such warming was due to the deposition of industrial era soot on the
snows and ice of that region.
The existence of alternative explanations for twentieth century warming
obviously has enormous implications for policy, for in order to determine how much to
spend to reduce human ghg emissions, one must know first have some idea how harmful
those emissions will be if they continue unabated. More precisely, what is ideally in
hand for the design of climate policy is an empirically testable model that can separately
identify the influence of the sun, natural climate variation, ghg emissions and other
human forcings. Such a model could then be used to identify the harm caused by
increases in human ghg emissions, holding constant the other factors that contribute to
climate swings. Without such a model, there is a great risk that one variable – human
ghg emissions – is being ascribed too much importance, leading to too great expenditures
to reduce such emissions.
D. Questionable methodology underlying highly publicized projected impacts of global
warming
One of the most widely publicized numbers in the establishment climate story is
the projection that 20-30 per cent of plant and animal species now existing may become
extinct due to global warming. This number is also one of the most troubling, because it
comes from a single study whose methodological validity has been severely questioned
by a large number of biologists. These biologists agree that the methodology neglects
many key processes that determine how the number of species will respond to changing
climate, and will always lead to an overestimate of species loss due to climatic change.
In its 2007 Summary for Policymakers released before the full Climate Science
AR, the IPCC used the highly dramatic 20-30 per cent species loss number without any
qualifications. In this instance, the role of rhetorical technique seems inextricably linked
to substantive content. For suppose that the IPCC had been required to accompany every
publicized projection – regarding both climate change and climate change impact – with
even a brief accompanying statement summarizing and making available citations to
work critical of the methodology underlying the projection. In the instance of the
projected species loss probability, such a summary and disclosure of scientific critique
would have revealed such widespread scientific doubt about the underlying method as to
make it highly unlikely that the IPCC could actually put the numerical projection
generated by that method in a Summary for Policymakers.
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By putting an unqualified species loss probability number in the Summary for
Policymakers, the IPCC has validated that number and thus encouraged its adoption and
use in legal policy analysis. Freeman and Guzman, for example, note340 that when the
IPCC-endorsed species loss probability is multiplied by an estimate of the dollar cost of
species loss generated by Cass Sunstein, the resultant estimate is that climate change
caused species loss will cost the U.S. between 1.4 and 3.5% of annual GDP per year.341
This number relies not only upon species loss estimates that, as explained above, are
simply rejected as invalid by a large number of biologists, but also upon an ad hoc
method of calculating the dollar cost of species loss that is without economic
foundation.342 Yet according to Freeman and Guzman, this massive estimated GDP cost
of climate change – induced species loss is “conservative,” because the methods used to
estimate and value species loss “oversimplify the complex ecological interactions
between species and ecosystems…[t]aking these interactions into account would
probably make the numbers much larger.”343 Perhaps nothing that the IPCC said could
have caused Freeman and Guzman to be less certain of the catastrophe that global
warming will bring to non-human species. Still, had the IPCC put the species probability
number in the context of widespread criticism by biologists of the methods used to
generate it, then it seems hard to imagine that very many informed readers of IPCC
Reports could possibly be persuaded to share Freeman and Guzman’s certainty of
catastrophe.
III. Conclusion: Questioning the Established Science, and Developing a Suitably
Skeptical Rather than Faith-based Climate Policy
Even if the reader is at this point persuaded to believe that there remain very
important open questions about ghg emissions and global warming, and important areas
of disagreement among climate scientists, she may well ask: So what? After all, such a
reader might argue, CO2 is a ghg, and if we continue to increase CO2, then it seems clear
that despite whatever uncertainty there may be about how much temperatures will
increase as a consequence of increasing CO2 in the atmosphere, and about the impacts of
such rising temperatures, there is no doubt that temperatures will increase with increasing
CO2, and that at some point, such rising temperatures will cause harm, so that one way or
another, at one time or another, we simply have to reduce our emissions of CO2.
However beguiling, such an argument not only oversimplifies the policy
questions raised by human ghg emissions, it is also misunderstands the significance of the
scientific questions revealed by my cross examination for the predictability of
anthroprogenically-forced climate change. Consider first the scientific questions. If
climate were a simple linear system – with increases in atmospheric CO2 directly and
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simply determining future warming – then while a detailed understanding of the earth’s
climate system might still of scientific interest, there would be little policy justification
for expending large amounts of public money to gain such an understanding. But if one
thing is clear in climate science it is that the earth’s climate system is not linear, but is
instead a highly complex, non-linear system made up of sub-systems – such as the
ENSO, and the North Atlantic Oscillation, and the various circulating systems of the
oceans – that are themselves highly non-linear. Among other things, such non-linearity
means that it may be extremely difficult to separately identify the impact of an external
shock to the system – such as what climate scientists call anthropogenic CO2 forcing –
from changes that are simply due to natural cycles, or due to other external natural and
anthropogenic forces, such as solar variation and human land use changes. Perhaps even
more importantly, any given forcing may have impacts that are much larger – in the case
of positive feedbacks – or much smaller – in the case of negative feedbacks – than a
simple, linear vision of the climate system would suggest. Because of the system’s
complexity and non-linearity, without a quite detailed understanding of the system,
scientists cannot provide useful guidance regarding the impact on climate of increases in
atmospheric ghg concentration.
As a large number of climate scientists have stressed, such an understanding will
come about only if theoretical and model-driven predictions are tested against actual
observational evidence. This is just to say that to really provide policymakers with the
kind of information they need, climate scientists ought to follow the scientific method of
developing theories and then testing those theories against the best available evidence. It
is here that the cross examination conducted above yields its most valuable lesson, for it
reveals what seem to be systematic patterns and practices that diverge from, and
problems that impede, the application of basic scientific methods in establishment climate
science. Among the most surprising and yet standard practices is a tendency in
establishment climate science to simply ignore published studies that develop and/or
present evidence tending to disconfirm various predictions or assumptions of the
establishment view that increases in CO2 explain virtually all recent climate change.
Perhaps even more troubling, when establishment climate scientists do respond to studies
supporting alternative hypotheses to the CO2 primacy view, they more often than not rely
upon completely different observational datasets which they say confirm (or at least don’t
disconfirm) climate model predictions. The point is important and worth further
elucidation: while there are quite a large number of published papers reporting evidence
that seems to disconfirm one or another climate model prediction, there is virtually no
instance in which establishment climate scientists have taken such disconfirming
evidence as an indication that the climate models may simply be wrong. Rather, in every
important case, the establishment response is to question the reliability of the
disconfirming evidence and then to find other evidence that is consistent with model
predictions. Of course, the same point may be made of climate scientists who present the
disconfirming studies: they tend to rely upon different datasets than do establishment
climate scientists. From either point of view, there seems to be a real problem for climate
science: With many crucial, testable predications – as for example the model prediction
of differential tropical tropospheric versus surface warming – there is no indication that
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climate scientists are converging toward the use of standard observational datasets that
they agree to be valid and reliable.
Without such convergence, the predictions of climate models (and climate change
theories more generally) cannot be subject to empirical testing, for it will always be
possible for one side in any dispute to use one observational dataset and the other side to
use some other observational dataset. Hence perhaps the central policy implication of the
cross-examination conducted above is a very concrete and yet perhaps surprising one:
public funding for climate science should be concentrated on the development of better,
standardized observational datasets that achieve close to universal acceptance as valid
and reliable. We should not be using public money to pay for faster and faster computers
so that increasingly fine-grained climate models can be subjected to ever larger numbers
of simulations until we have got the data to test whether the predictions of existing
models are confirmed (or not disconfirmed) by the evidence.
This might seem like a more or less obvious policy recommendation, but if it
were taken, it would represent not only a change in climate science funding practices, but
also a reaffirmation of the role of basic scientific methodology in guiding publicly funded
climate science. As things now stand, the advocates representing the establishment
climate science story broadcast (usually with color diagrams) the predictions of climate
models as if they were the results of experiments – actual evidence. Alongside these
multi-colored multi-century model-simulated time series come stories, anecdotes, and
photos – such as the iconic stranded polar bear -- dramatically illustrating climate change
today. On this rhetorical strategy, the models are to be taken on faith, and the stories and
photos as evidence of the models’ truth. Policy carrying potential costs in the trillions of
dollars ought not to be based on stories and photos confirming faith in models, but rather
on precise and replicable testing of the models’ predictions against solid observational
data.
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